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ABSTRACT. Public policy in the United States is disproportionately responsive to the
wealthy, and the traditional response to this problem, campaign finance regulation, has failed. As
students of politics have long recognized, however, political influence flows not only from wealth
but also from organization, a form of political power open to all income groups. Accordingly, as
this Essay argues, a promising alternative to campaign finance regulations is legal interventions
designed to facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class. To date, the most
important legal intervention of this kind has been labor law, and the labor union has been the
central vehicle for this type of organizing. But the labor union as a political-organizational
vehicle suffers a fundamental flaw: unions bundle political organization with collective
bargaining, a highly contested form of economic organization. As a result, opposition to
collective bargaining impedes unions' ability to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lower-
and middle-income groups.
This Essay proposes that labor law unbundle the union, allowing employees to organize
politically through the union form without also organizing economically for collective bargaining
purposes. Doing so would have the immediate effect of liberating political-organizational efforts
from the constraints of collective bargaining, an outcome that could mitigate representational
inequality. The Essay identifies the legal reforms that would be necessary to enable such
unbundled "political unions" to succeed. It concludes by looking beyond the union context and
suggesting a broader regime of reforms aimed at facilitating political organizing by those income
groups for whom representational inequality is now a problem.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a good time to be wealthy in America and a tough time not to be. This
is true not only because of the well-known economic problems facing low- and
middle-income Americans. It is true because the poor and middle class have a
major political problem today. The problem is that the government is
strikingly unresponsive to their views.' As Martin Gilens concludes in his study
of contemporary American politics, "the preferences of the vast majority of
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the
government does or doesn't adopt."'
No government, of course, is perfectly responsive to its citizenry, and
perfect responsiveness is not even an aspiration of our democratic order.3 But it
remains a fundamental democratic commitment that policies enacted by the
government reflect the preferences of the polity. To borrow Dahl's
formulation, "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered
as political equals."4 The degree of representational inequality that currently
defines American political practice is thus a matter of substantial concern.
The wealthy have disproportionate influence over public policy because, to
state the obvious, they have more money.5 Because it is the wealthy who make
campaign contributions, fund independent electoral expenditures, and pay for
lobbyists, policy is more responsive to those with money than to those without
1. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-
TAKE-AIL POLITICS: How WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK
ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY,
THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2012).
2. GILENS, supra note i, at 1; see also BARTELS, supra note I, at 275 ("[L]ow-income citizens as a
group seem to be getting no representation . . . ."); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 599
(concluding that "inequalities of political voice characterize American politics").
3. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2oo8 Term -Foreword: System Effects and the
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2009).
4. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPosITION 1 (1971).
5. As discussed below, both Bartels and Gilens consider and refite the argument that the
wealthy's disproportionate influence over policy stems from some other variable like higher




it.' Given the political influence that wealth bestows, scholars and Congress
have understandably focused political reform proposals on campaign finance.7
But these attempts to get money out of politics have devolved into a cat-and-
mouse game in which political actors bent on avoiding regulation, and a
Supreme Court bent on invalidating it, have rendered the reforms ineffectual.'
After all, the Court has now struck down all forms of independent expenditure
limitations, and political actors have designed ways to frustrate even the most
creative restraints on campaign spending.9
Fortunately, however, money is not the only source of influence in
American politics. Political power also flows from political organization, and
organization is a source of power available to all income groups."o As this Essay
will suggest, legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing by the
poor and middle class are thus a viable alternative to campaign finance reforms
and a promising means of redressing representational inequality.
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS -AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); see also GILENS, supra note i, at io (arguing that money "is the root
of representational inequality").
7. Some notable exceptions include Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Enclave Districting, 8 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 135 (1999); Emma Greenman, Strengthening the Hand of Voters in the Marketplace
ofIdeas: Roadmap to Campaign Finance Reforn in a Post-Wisconsin Right to Life Era, 24 J.L.
& POL. 209 (20o8); and Bertrall L. Ross II & Terry Smith, Minimum Responsiveness and the
Political Exclusion of the Poor, 72 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (2009).
8. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REv. 1705 (1999). Michael Kang uses the "cat-and-mouse" metaphor as well.
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REv. 1, 53 (2012). Heather
Gerken describes campaign finance reform efforts as "the regulatory equivalent of whack-a-
mole." Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 1155, 1157 (2011). As discussed below, some campaign finance scholars are
abandoning strategies that focus on campaign finance and advocating lobbying reform. See,
e.g., Gerken, supra; Kang, supra. This Essay shares the view that more or better campaign
finance regulation is not the solution to what ails our politics, but it proposes a different
approach for moving forward. See infra Part III.
9. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARv. L. REV. 118, 125 & n.38
(2010); LESSIG, supra note 6, at 271 (admitting his proposal's "Achilles' heel" lies in the
possibility for independent expenditures).
1o. See GILENS, supra note 1, at 7 (describing interest groups as a "parallel channel of influence
over government policy"). Walter Korpi offers an early and influential account of the
importance of collective political organization for lower- and middle-class citizens. WALTER
KoRPI, THE DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE 26 (1983) ("[T]he major power resources of the
wage-earners are their organizations for collective action."); see also Nathan J. Kelly, Political
Choice, Public Policy, and Distributional Outcomes, 49 AM. J. POL. Sci. 865, 867 (2005) ("[T]he
lower classes must organize in order for their collective voice to be heard and influence
outcomes.").
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In the United States, the legal regime that has most successfully facilitated
lower- and middle-class political organizing has been labor law, and the labor
union has been a critical vehicle for lower- and middle-class political
organization." At the peak of union strength, more than twenty million
Americans -nearly all within the income classes for whom representational
inequality is now a problem -exercised collective political voice through the
union form." Unions have successfully mobilized their memberships to vote,
and, by aggregating millions of small-dollar donations from these members,
have built effective lobbying operations, led extensive independent electoral
efforts, and positioned themselves as leading campaign contributors. 3 At times
and on certain issues, unions have been politically liberal; at other times and on
other issues, they have taken conservative -even reactionary-positions. 4 But,
11. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 1, at 56-57; SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN &
HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 384
(1995) (observing that unions "play a significant role in the political mobilization of those
who, on the basis of their income and education, might otherwise not take part politically").
This is true internationally as well. See, e.g., KORIi, supra note lo, at 54 (noting that,
internationally, "[a]mong citizens in the lower socio-economic strata with individually small
resources, the availability of collective resources in the form of organizations -primarily
trade unions and working-class parties - is of prime importance").
12. See infra text accompanying note 85. At many historical moments, however, unions have
performed poorly as the political representative of minority subgroups within the poor and
middle classes and of poor and middle-class women. See, e.g., PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND
BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY 44-69 (2008) (discussing the NAACP's unsuccessful efforts to desegregate unions
from 1940 to 1968). More recently, as unions have concentrated organizational efforts in
sectors of the labor market dominated by racial minorities and women, they have improved
along these lines. See, e.g., Kate Bronfenbrenner, Organizing Women: The Nature and Process
of Union-Organizing Efforts Among U.S. Women Workers Since the Mid-1990s, 32 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 441, 443-47 (2005) (noting that new organizing among women has outpaced
new organizing among men since the mid-198os, but that those gains were highly uneven
between sectors); Kate Bronfenbrenner & Dorian T. Warren, Race, Gender, and the Rebirth of
Trade Unionism, 16 NEW LAB. F. 142, 143 (2007) ("[W]orkers of color, and especially black
men and women, are organizing and organizing successfully at disproportionate rates, even
though these workers have been the hardest hit by manufacturing job losses and the
downsizing of the public sector."); Dorian T. Warren, The American Labor Movement in the
Age of Obama: The Challenges and Opportunities ofa Racialized Political Economy, 8 PERSP. ON
POL. 847, 853 (2010) (describing some recent examples of successful organizing that
incorporated "racial and gender concerns," which "represent[s] a significant shift in union
strategy reflecting organized labor's commitment to transforming racial and economic
inequality").
13. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
14. See, e.g., Janice Fine & Daniel J. Tichenor, A Movement Wrestling: American Labor's Enduring




when they were active and strong, unions helped ensure that the government
was responsive to the actual preferences of the poor and middle class."
Today, however, labor unions face a major obstacle to their ability to
organize workers politically. The obstacle derives from the fact that unions
bundle political organization with a specific and highly contested form of
economic organization. Under our labor law regime, that is, unionization
requires workers to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining with their
employers in order to organize for political action.
From the perspective of political organization, this is a problem, and for
several reasons. First, in recent years, managerial opposition to collective
bargaining has become widespread and highly effective, and this opposition
has made traditional union organizing difficult and increasingly rare." Second,
changes in the structure of markets and the way work is organized have made
collective bargaining hard to sustain in the contemporary economy.17 And,
third, at most, only about half of all workers now want to engage in collective
bargaining, meaning that unions are not a viable political vehicle for
approximately half of the labor force."
American labor movement's position on immigration and pointing to periods in which
unions pushed for restrictionist policies).
15. See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note i, at 245; see also infra notes 100-103.
16. See, e.g., KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MOBILITY ON
WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING 43 (2000) (noting that managerial opposition is
"extremely effective in reducing union election win rates"); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling
Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARv. L. REv.
655, 684 (2010) (reviewing data).
17. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004).
is. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 17-18 (updated ed. 2006)
(reporting polls showing support for unionization ranging from 32%-53%); Richard B.
Freeman, Do Workers Still Want Unions? More than Ever (Econ. Policy Inst. Briefing Paper
No. 182, 2007), http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp182/bp82.pdf. Freeman's most recent
data suggest that 58% of workers would join a union under the right conditions. See
Freeman, supra, at 6. Two Zogby polls conducted around the same time as Freeman's study
found that only 36% of non-unionized workers would vote for a union, The Attitudes and
Opinions of Unionized and Non-Unionized Workers Employed in Various Sectors of the Economy
Toward Organized Labor, ZOGBY INT'L 33 (2005), http://www.psrf.org/info
/NationwideAttitudesTowardUnions_200s.pdf, while 45% of those surveyed would be
"likely" to join one, Nationwide Attitudes Toward Unions, ZOGBY INT'L 14 (2004),
http://www.psrf.org/info/Nationwide AttitudesTowardUnions_200 4.pdf The exact
number is of little significance; the point is that a substantial percentage of workers does not
desire unionization in its traditional form.
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These obstacles that collective bargaining poses to the viability of unions
have contributed to a sharp decline in unionization rates. From a peak of
thirty-five percent in the mid-1950s, 9 unions now represent less than seven
percent of private sector workers.2 o And this decline in unionization rates has,
in turn, contributed significantly to the declining responsiveness of American
politics to the poor and middle class.
For decades, scholars and policymakers have been proposing ways to
reform labor law in order to better facilitate unionization.2 If our goal,
however, is not to increase the prevalence of collective bargaining but, instead,
to facilitate political organizing among politically underrepresented groups,
then there is a new possibility for reform. Namely, we could unbundle the
collective bargaining and political functions of unions and allow employees to
organize politically through the union form without also organizing
economically for collective bargaining.
In fact, there is nothing in the nature of unionization that requires the
bundling of economic and political functions. Bundling is instead an artifact of
history and, more to the point, of law. Workers who sought to improve
workplace conditions through collective bargaining often turned to politics to
achieve similar goals, and they found that their unions were well suited to act
as collective political agents. Contemporary labor law reflects this historical
practice of bundling and perpetuates it.2 But, while bundling has made sense
ig. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 23 (2004).
20. The rate is eleven percent when public sector workers are included. Union Members-2o12,
BUREAU LAB. STATS. 1 (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
21. See, e.g., HACKER & PIERSON, supra note i, at 139-42; see also infra notes 130-131 (collecting
sources).
22. See, e.g., Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); WILLIAM B.
GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE
LAw 166 (1993); Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46
STAN. L. REV. 305, 353-55 (1994); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining
a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 75 (1993); Sachs, supra note
16.
23. In brief, the National Labor Relations Act enables workers to organize "for the purposes of
collective bargaining" with management, 29 U.S.C. 5 Is7 (20o6), and it imposes a "mutual
obligation" on the union and management to bargain collectively over "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment," id. § 158(d). Such a collective bargaining union
may also serve as a vehicle for the workers' collective political voice, but it is statutorily
obligated to fulfill its collective bargaining role. Similar provisions in state labor laws have
the same effect. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3515 (West 2012) (stating that employees have




in certain contexts, nothing in the history of the union movement suggests that
collective bargaining and political action must go together. Moreover, the legal
regime that has required a bundling of political and economic functions could
just as well allow employees to organize unions for political purposes but not
collective bargaining ones.
An unbundled labor law would allow workers engaged in new organizing
efforts to form either a traditional union or what this Essay will name a
"political union." Political unions would be barred by statute from engaging
in collective bargaining, but they would be able to serve as a vehicle for
collective political voice for workers who decided to join the union. Unlike
traditional unions, political unions would-for reasons this Essay will
discuss -represent only workers who affirmatively desired to join and support
the union: mandatory membership or mandatory dues payment arrangements
of any kind would be out of place in this context."
As this Essay will explain, the statutory work of unbundling would not be
terribly complex. But an unbundled labor law would nonetheless have a critical
role to play in facilitating the organization of political unions. In brief,
traditional labor law has done four key things to enable workers to use the
employment relationship as a locus for organizational activity and thereby to
overcome what would otherwise be potentially insurmountable collective
action problems.26 First, labor law allows workers to use the workplace as a
employer-employee relations"); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/2 (2012) (stating that public
employees have the right to organize "for the purpose of negotiating wages, hours and other
conditions of employment or other mutual aid or protection").
24. This Essay is concerned with ways to increase political organizing among the poor and
middle class, and thus focuses on new organizing efforts among workers not currently in
traditional unions. Of course, workers in traditional unions have the right to decertify their
unions, and, in an unbundled regime, workers could decide to decertify a bundled union
and then organize a political union. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii). But such an action is
unlikely to increase the political representation of those workers and is thus not part of the
proposal here.
25. See infra Part III.
26. This Essay will use "labor law" to refer primarily to the federal statutes governing private
sector unionization and labor-management relations, see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187, and the
analysis here will focus on the private sector. It is true that, in the respects relevant here,
state labor laws-which govern state and local public sector employees and which are
generally modeled on the federal statute-perform essentially the same functions and have
had essentially the same effects as their private sector analogues. See RICHARD C. KEARNEY,
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (4 th ed. 20o8); Joseph E. Slater, The "American
Rule" that Swallows the Exceptions, ii EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53, 83 (2007). Nonetheless,
the ways in which particular state labor statutes diverge from the federal one are beyond the
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geographic site for organizational activity, thereby significantly decreasing the
coordination costs of organizing. Second, labor law allows unions to harness
the employer's administrative capacity-in particular, its payroll function-to
fund union operations." Third, labor law allows unions to use the employer's
informational resources - in particular, data about employees - for
organizational purposes, thus dramatically reducing the information costs of
organizing. And, fourth, labor law prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees engaged in organizational activity, thereby preventing the
employer's "rational predatory action" from impeding organizing efforts."
An unbundled labor law that offered these same four legal advantages to
political unions could enable workers to overcome the hurdles to collective
political action and take advantage of the union form as a vehicle for collective
political voice.
However achieved, unbundling would expand employees' choice set in a
critical way: it would allow employees to organize politically through the union
form even if they oppose collective bargaining, and it would thereby expand
the range of people for whom unionization is a viable form of political
organization. Moreover, because workers would choose the political projects
that each of these new unions would pursue-and because those projects
would not have to be tied to any traditional union agenda -political unions
might better capture the range of political preferences and views of their
members than do traditional unions.2 9
Significantly, political unions would also likely generate less managerial
opposition than collective-bargaining unions do, and for several reasons. One,
some political unions would devote themselves to policies - on social issues, for
example - that firm management would consider non-threatening, or
irrelevant, or might even favor. Two, political unions could exercise influence
only in the political arena and not at the bargaining table, and thus their power
vis-a-vis the individual firm would be more diffuse than the power of
traditional unions. Operating at the level of the polity would also mean that
political unions would generally be less able to place their firms at a
competitive disadvantage vis-t-vis non-union firms. And, because of the
scope of this Essay, as is a discussion of other ways in which a public-sector analysis would
diverge from the one offered here.
27. See infra Section II.B.
28. Richard A. Posner, Some Economics ofLabor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 988, 994 (1984).
29. For a discussion of the choice implications of bundling in a related context, see Richard
Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.




greater range of interests represented in the political arena than at the
collective-bargaining table, politics-only unions would also be less likely to
secure any anti-competitive demands that they might make. Last, and of equal
importance, if and when management does oppose workers' efforts to organize
political unions, unbundling would change the social resonance of that
opposition.
Indeed, as the Essay will show, there is some preliminary evidence that
organizing for politics but not collective bargaining is feasible. There are, to be
sure, no extant models of the kind of political unions this Essay proposes. But,
in emerging sectors of the labor market where labor law does not apply a
bundling requirement, unions have succeeded in organizing workers
exclusively for political purposes.
More broadly, identifying the ways in which labor law can facilitate
political organizing among workers points us towards a more comprehensive
set of reforms designed to enable organizing by politically underrepresented
groups. Such an approach to political reform, moreover, has a significant
advantage over traditional modes of regulation. No matter how creative the
design, campaign finance law does nothing to alter the underlying conditions
that produce political inequality. 30 To the contrary, traditional modes of
political reform attempt to regulate the processes through which the power of
wealth is exercised, but they leave in place the distribution of wealth that
creates the problems for political equality in the first place. The result is the
undoing of the reforms through repeated circumventions that have been aptly
analogized to a hydraulic process.3' Legal interventions designed to facilitate
organizing are fundamentally different because political organization, like
wealth, is itself a source of political power. 2 Thus, like wealth, the power that
flows from organization can be exercised across processes of political
participation- in elections, lobbying, media, and the rest. For this reason,
reforms designed to facilitate political organizing are more likely to avoid the
problems of circumvention that have undermined traditional modes of
regulation.
Three brief words on the premises of the argument. First, the Essay
assumes that, in light of the gross disparities in political influence currently
enjoyed by different income groups, legal reforms designed to increase the
political influence of lower- and middle-income groups are justified by a
30. See infra Section I.B (noting that the same is true for public financing of elections, for
restrictions on lobbying activity, and for public financing of lobbyists).
31. See Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 8.
32. See, e.g., KORPI, supra note io.
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commitment to political equality. An argument of this sort can be met with the
objection that, to succeed, it must articulate the optimal level of political
influence that the groups in question ought to enjoy, along with a way of
measuring when and whether that optimal level is achieved. Otherwise, the
objection goes, the argument cannot allow us to evaluate whether the proposals
go too far, or not far enough, in redistributing political influence.33 But, as Rick
Pildes has written in a related context, "[i]n theory and in doctrine, we can
often identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong without a precise
standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or right."34 Thus, rather than
attempting to articulate such an optimal distribution of political power or a
way to measure it, the Essay instead proceeds on the more tractable
assumption that, in Rawls's terms, all citizens in a democracy -irrespective of
income level-ought to have an "approximately equal" chance of influencing
political decisions. 35
Second, representational inequality among income groups is not the only
type of representational inequality: policy may well be more responsive to
different racial groups, or geographic groups, or age groups. Without
adjudicating the priority of these different aspects of inequality, this Essay
limits its attention to economic forms of political inequality and thus its
proposals for intervention are similarly focused.
Third, this Essay suggests unbundling the union as a way to mitigate
representational inequality: it is an Essay about political organizing. But the
argument here does not imply that workers should not also have a collective
voice in the workplace. To the contrary, such a voice is critical for a host of
reasons, some of which I have pointed to elsewhere.3' The proposal in this
Essay is meant as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, efforts to
rethink collective economic representation at work.37
33. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L. REv. 1589, 1602-03 (1999) (making a
similar objection in a related context).
34. Richard H. Pildes, The Theory ofPolitical Competition, 85 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1612 (1999).
35. JOHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 327 (1993); see also Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming
Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 20o8 U. ILL. L. REv. 599,
6oi (describing Rawls's view that persons are entitled to "roughly equal" influence in the
electoral process).
36. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 375, 399-400
(2007) (noting that collective bargaining can have important redistributive effects and
correct certain market failures that inhere in individual employment contracting).
37. It may be, perhaps for reasons this Essay will discuss, that traditional collective bargaining is
no longer a viable means of securing that voice. In this respect, there is reason to hope that




The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the recent political
science on representational inequality and describes the findings that point to
substantial skew in policy responsiveness across income levels. The Part then
discusses the failure of the traditional response to representational inequality-
campaign finance regulation -and proposes an alternative: legal interventions
designed to enhance the political-organizational capacity of low- and middle-
income groups. Part II begins by identifying labor unions as an obvious source
of organizational voice for such groups. It then identifies the advantages that
the workplace offers to unions as a locus of organizational activity, and shows
the ways in which labor law allows unions to harness these advantages. But the
Part concludes by showing how the bundling of unions' collective bargaining
and political functions has impeded unions' viability as a political-
organizational vehicle. Part III argues that unbundling unions' political and
economic functions would increase their capacity to serve as a platform for
political organization. It argues that political action would not replicate for
political unions the impediments that collective bargaining has posed for
traditional unions, and it shows why political organizing can succeed even
when it is not grounded in the economic practice of collective bargaining. Part
IV describes the statutory reforms necessary to unbundle unions' political and
collective bargaining functions, and Part V suggests other contexts in which the
law might facilitate political organizing by lower- and middle-income citizens.
The Essay then concludes.
I. REPRESENTATIONAL INEQUALITY
A. Income and Responsiveness
Political equality is a core feature of democratic governance. While the
definition and appropriate scope of such equality is contested, there is general
agreement that citizens in a democracy ought to have an approximately equal
opportunity to influence the political process. 8 But theorists writing from a
wide range of perspectives have long argued that economic inequalities
threaten to subvert this democratic goal. Rawls, for example, was concerned
models borrowed from abroad-might offer ways of securing collective voice at work
without the flaws of traditional collective bargaining.
38. See supra note 35; see also Task Force on Inequality & Am. Democracy, American Democracy in
an Age of Rising Inequality, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 651, 651 (2004) (noting that "[e]qual political
voice and democratically responsive government" are American political ideals and
discussing how progress toward realizing these ideals has stalled).
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that "those with greater property and wealth" would capture "the electoral
process to their advantage."39 Schattschneider believed that economic
inequality builds an "upper-class bias" into democratic politics, 4o and Walzer
expressed concern that "the dominance of money in the sphere of politics"
would render much of the populace politically powerless.41 In more
contemporary work, Hall and Deardorff argue that the affluent can "distort[]"
policymaking in their favor through lobbying.42
Contemporary empirical research in political science confirms the theorists'
concerns. Most prominently, in a book published last year, Martin Gilens
reports the findings of an analysis of two decades of U.S. public policy.43 Gilens
finds that as the gap between the preferences of the poor (those in the bottom
income decile) and the preferences of the affluent (those in the top income
decile) increases - that is, as the rich and poor disagree more - there is a major
decline in the association between the poor's preferences and policy
outcomes." Put plainly, "when preferences between the well-off and the poor
diverge, government policy bears absolutely no relationship to the degree of
support or opposition among the poor."45
39. RAWLS, supra note 35, at 360.
40. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REAUST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 31 (1975). Schattschneider famously concluded that "[t]he flaw in the pluralist
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent." Id. at 34-35.
41. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: ADEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 310 (1983).
42. See, e.g., Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, loo AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 69, 81 (2006); see also id. at 70-72 (reviewing the literature on theories of
lobbying). Campaign finance scholars share the view that wealth translates into
representational inequality. Gerken, for example, writes that "money distorts political
incentives," by which she means that "money makes politicians pay less attention to average,
everyday people and more attention to wealthy corporate interests." Gerken, supra note 8, at
1156.
43. Gilens's main data set is based on nearly two thousand public opinion surveys conducted
between 1981 and 2002. GILENS, supra note i, at 57. Gilens's study was directed at discerning
what he calls the "democratic responsiveness" of the U.S. Government where, by
responsiveness, Gilens means a "positive association between the level of public support for
a policy and the likelihood of that policy being adopted." Id. at 70.
44. See id. at 79. But there is only a slight decline in the association between preferences and
policy for the affluent. See id. In fact, on policy questions where the preferences of low- and
high-income respondents diverge by more than ten percentage points, policy outcomes
show a "strong association with the preferences of the affluent ... but no association with
the preferences of the poor at all." Id.




These results might be consistent with democratic principles if the views of
poor respondents are simply minority views. But Gilens finds that median-
income earners fare no better than the poor when they part ways with the
policy positions of the affluent. Where the preferences of these two income
groups diverge by ten percentage points or more, policy responsiveness for the
ninetieth income percentile holds steady and strong, but is statistically
equivalent to zero for those at the fiftieth income percentile.46 Most
importantly, Gilens finds that even when the poor and middle classes agree
with one another and together disagree with the affluent, it is still the views of
the affluent that get translated into policy.47 Gilens thus concludes that "for
Americans below the top of the income distribution, any association between
preferences and policy outcomes is likely to reflect the extent to which their
preferences coincide with those of the affluent."48
Although Gilens's findings are striking, his research confirms earlier work
by Larry Bartels and others.49 Bartels's influential study found that U.S.
senators are far more responsive to the policy preferences of their affluent
constituents than they are to those of their lower- and middle-class
constituents.s0 As Bartels put it, senators "were vastly more responsive to
affluent constituents than to constituents of modest means,"5' and "the views of
constituents in the bottom third of the income distribution received no weight
at all in the voting decisions of their senators."52
46. Id. The same is true irrespective of which income group is used as the comparison set: when
the views of Americans in the tenth, thirtieth, fiftieth, or seventieth income percentile
diverge from the views of those in the ninetieth, it is the views of the affluent that carry the
day. Id. at 81-82 & fig.3.6.
47. As he puts it, even "when middle-class preferences align with those of the poor,
responsiveness to the affluent remains strong while responsiveness to the poor and middle
class is completely absent." Id. at 84.
48. Id. at 83. Gilens considers but rejects the possibility that policy is influencing the preferences
of the affluent rather than vice versa. See id. at 93-96.
49. See BARTELS, supra note 1, at 252-82; see also Task Force on Inequality & Am. Democracy,
supra note 38, at 659 (summarizing similar research).
So. See BARTELS, supra note 1, at 253-60.
s. Id. at 253.
52. Id. at 254. Unlike Gilens, Bartels reports some political influence among the middle third of
the income distribution. As he writes, "the views of constituents in the upper third of the
income distribution received about 5o% more weight than those in the middle third," id. at
253-54, while those in the lower third, again, "were utterly irrelevant," id. at 260.
Aside from the implications of representational inequality for democratic practice-
which are the focus here -it is worth noting that representational inequality has concrete
implications for policy development in the United States. That is, American public policy,
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The fact that policy is more responsive to the affluent than to other income
groups does not tell us why this is so, and it is possible that responsiveness
follows not wealth, but voting rates or other measures of political activity that
the affluent also happen to exhibit. Here too, though, Gilens and Bartels reach
similar conclusions. Both investigate the possibility that policy is particularly
responsive to the affluent because the affluent vote more or are otherwise more
active in politics. Both reject this possibility. Bartels, for example, shows that
while there are significant voting gaps between high- and low-income groups,
the differences are not large enough to account for the skew in policy
responsiveness." In fact, Bartels concludes that accounting for differences in
voting rates, political knowledge, and contact with public officials "reduces
only modestly the substantial income-based disparities in responsiveness."s4
It is important to clarify two things that Gilens's and Bartels's work does
not imply. First, their conclusions do not mean that the affluent always do -or
across a wide range of subject areas, would be diferent if policy responsiveness were not
skewed toward the affluent. To take just a few of the leading examples, there is significant
preference divergence across income groups with respect to international trade, see GILENS,
supra note i, at 107-08; the progressivity of income taxes, see id. at 115-16; government
regulation generally, see id. at 116; government regulation of corporations in particular, see
id.; reproductive rights, see id. at 111; and government policy toward unemployment, see id.
at 116. In some areas-economic policy in particular-the poor and middle class take
recognizably more progressive positions than the affluent; in other areas -including social
and moral questions like reproductive rights-the poor and middle class are notably more
conservative than the rich. But, whatever the political valence of the effect, greater
representational equality would lead to a set of policies different from those we have today.
See id. at 117 (minimum wage, unemployment benefits, corporate regulation, and tax); id. at
108 (trade and foreign aid); id. at 113 (abortion).
53. BARTELS, supra note i, at 275. As Bartels reports, in the 1988, 1990, and 1992 general
elections, eighty percent of high-income earners reported voting while only sixty percent of
low-income earners did. Thus, as he puts it:
Even with considerable allowance for overreporting of turnout, it is obvious that
tens of millions of low-income citizens are showing up at the polls. Nevertheless,
low-income citizens as a group seem to be getting no representation . ... Income-
related disparities in turnout simply do not seem large enough to provide a
plausible explanation for the income-related disparities in responsiveness
documented here.
Id.
54. Id. at 279. Gilens, moreover, demonstrates that middle-income Americans vote and
participate in politics at about the same rate as the affluent. In fact, Gilens points out, the
only way in which political participation differs meaningfully between these income groups
is with respect to financial contributions. See GH.ENs, supra note 1, at 239. Bartels adds that
his data are consistent with the conclusion that "senators represented their campaign




always will - get their way. Government is highly responsive to the preferences
of the affluent and more responsive to their preferences than to the preferences
of the poor and middle class, but the government is not perfectly responsive to
what the wealthy want. Indeed, some government policies are enacted despite
the fact that majorities of all income groups- including the wealthy-oppose
them, and many policies are not enacted despite the fact that broad cross-
sections of the public- including the wealthy-support them.5 Second, and
more important, the Gilens and Bartels analyses do not mean that low- and
middle-income citizens never do-or never will-get their way. To the
contrary, there are many issues on which the preferences of the poor and
middle class find expression in enacted policy. The problem is that the poor
and middle classes' preferences tend to get enacted into policy only when their
preferences align with the preferences of the wealthy.s'
B. Addressing the Problem: From Finance to Organization
The traditional, and perhaps most obvious, response to representational
inequality is campaign finance reform. If the wealthy have disproportionate
influence over the political process because they are able to deploy their wealth
to political ends, regulations that restrict the political uses of money make
sense. And, for over a century, reformers in Congress have attempted to
address the political influence of wealth by enacting restrictions on campaign
spending? The efforts began at the opening of the twentieth century with the
Tillman Act, a law that responded to the popular movement for "elections free
from the power of money."s' From 1907 on, legislative efforts at campaign
finance regulation have followed a steady path forward, expanding to sweep in
more spenders, more elections, and more forms of spending. 59
s. See GILENS, supra note i, at 73 fig.3.2.
56. There is an additional context in which the preferences of the poor and middle class get
translated into policy, even when those preferences diverge from the views of the affluent.
With respect to the (quite narrow) range of issues on which interest group pressure aligns
with the preferences of the poor and middle class and against the preferences of the wealthy,
policy may well come to reflect the preferences of lower- and middle-income groups. This
Essay takes up this important exception in Section I.B, infra.
S7. See Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance
Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 871 (2004).
58. Id. at 877 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003)).
sq. See generally Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance
Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 7-48 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds.,
2005) (providing a detailed history of campaign finance regulations); Kurt Hohenstein,
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Despite multiple interventions of increasing complexity and scope,
however, campaign finance regulation has, to put it mildly, not succeeded in
curbing the role and influence of money in American politics. This failure is
well documented in the literature. In The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform,so for example, Issacharoff and Karlan showed that political actors
adjust to campaign finance regulation by reorganizing and redirecting political
spending in ways not reached by existing law."1 The election cycles since
Issacharoff and Karlan's writing lend support to their thesis."2
It is not only the ingenuity of political spenders that has stymied campaign
finance reform, however. The Supreme Court, too, has limited the range of
regulation permissible under the First Amendment. The Court's restrictive
interventions began with Buckley v. Valeo,3 which struck down limits on
independent expenditures by individuals, and continue today, most notably
with Citizens United v. FEC.64 As Michael Kang explains, Citizens United
effectively makes any type of meaningful campaign finance regulation (other
than restrictions on direct contributions to candidates and certain disclosure
requirements) unconstitutional.6 s The decision, in other words, "leaves
virtually no constitutional space for new campaign finance regulation.""6
Given their view that campaign finance reform has reached a dead end,
many election law scholars now argue that some other approach is needed to
deal with the influence of wealth on politics. In Kang's view, the appropriate
move is away from what he calls the ex ante regulation of campaign spending
and toward the ex post regulation of the legislative process, especially through
"Clio, Meet Buckley-Buckley, Clio": Re-Introducing History to Unravel the Tangle of
Campaign Finance Reform, i ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 63 (2oo8).
6o. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 8.
61. As they observed, "[t]he money that reform squeezes out of the formal campaign process
must go somewhere." Id. at 1713.
62. See Victoria S. Shabo, Comment, "Money, Like Water. Revisiting Equality in Campaign
Finance Regulation After the 2004 "Summer of527s," 84 N.C. L. REV. 221 (2005)-
63. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
64. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
6s. See Kang, supra note 8, at 6.
66. Id. at 52. Kang, moreover, is not alone in his assessment that Citizens United signals the
terminal end-at least given the current composition of the Supreme Court - for campaign
finance regulation. Gerken, for example, writes: "Whatever you think about the goal of
taking money out of politics, Citizens United provides the latest, and perhaps the best,
evidence that this goal is a dead end for reform, at least in the short term." Gerken, supra




lobbying reform.1 Although Kang's account is helpful in moving the
discussion beyond spending restrictions, lobbying regulation presents some of
the same difficulties as campaign finance regulation. First, as Kang
acknowledges, "lobbying reform faces its own constitutional challenges under
the First Amendment."" Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is not clear
why the same kind of hydraulics that plagued campaign finance restrictions
would not reproduce themselves in the context of lobbying restrictions. The
political actors who found ways around spending restrictions would likely find
ways of avoiding lobbying regulation as well.
Heather Gerken is also attracted to the idea of lobbying reform,6 9 but rather
than suggesting new restrictions on lobbying activity-an approach Gerken
categorizes as leveling down-she suggests that we find ways to level up by
expanding access to lobbyists. She thus characterizes her proposal as an analog
to the public financing of elections: supplement privately funded lobbyists
with publicly financed ones for those who otherwise would be locked out of the
lobbying game.7 0
Conceptually, the leveling-up strategy for legal intervention into the
political process embodies what Bruce Cain calls the "more voice, not less"
approach to reform.1 As Cain puts it, "another way to neutralize political
advantage aside from capping and prohibiting is to support countervailing
voices."7 Cain locates this approach in the Madisonian idea of fighting faction
with faction, and in the pluralist idea of "expand[ing] the number of players in
a political area to offset the advantages of the dominant players."73 Like Gerken,
67. See Kang, supra note 8, at 56-63.
68. Id. at 6o. And while Kang points to some recent cases in which the Supreme Court has been
willing to uphold some regulation of the legislative process, other recent cases point in a
decidedly different direction. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010)
(reading "honest services" statute narrowly).
69. Gerken, supra note 8, at 155 (arguing, tentatively, that "lobbying is the new campaign
finance").
70. See id. at i165-68. Gerken is careful to note that her proposal is tentative and at the "'does
this dog hunt?' stage." Id. at 1165. As she also notes, the proposal tracks one that Bruce Cain
has made, calling for the creation of "public lobbyists along the model of public defenders in
criminal proceedings." Bruce E. Cain, More or Less: Searching for Regulatory Balance, in RACE,
REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 263, 278 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds.,
2011).
7. Cain, supra note 70, at 277.
72. Id.
73. Id.; cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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Cain sees public financing of both elections and lobbying as the primary way to
instantiate this approach to reform.
But the democratic tradition in which Cain grounds his idea supports other
approaches as well. In particular, the democratic norm of equal representation
can be advanced by legal interventions designed to address inequalities in
organizational capacity-interventions aimed at facilitating political organizing
by underrepresented groups. Rather than intervening later in the political
process by moving from elections to lobbying, that is, we can intervene earlier
in the process by facilitating the organizational development of
underrepresented groups. Writing in a related context, Joshua Cohen and Joel
Rogers made the point this way:
[I]nequalities in material advantage ... translate directly to inequalities
in political power. Groups can help remedy these inequalities by
permitting individuals with low per capita resources to pool those
resources through organization. In making the benefits of organization
available to those whose influence on policy is negligible without it,
groups help satisfy the norm of political equality.74
Moreover, legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing
have an important advantage over both the type of leveling-down restrictions
that Kang advocates and the leveling-up proposals of Cain and Gerken.
Neither campaign finance restrictions (or lobbying restrictions) nor public
financing of elections (or public financing of lobbying) address the underlying
inequalities in political power that flow from wealth. Rather, such regulations
change something about one or another of the multiple processes through
which such political power is expressed. The regulations might restrict
campaign spending, or they might equalize lobbying spending, but they do not
alter the background conditions that produce political inequalities in the first
place. Because the political power that comes from wealth is portable across
political processes - because "[t] he sheer versatility of material power is what
makes it so significant politically"75- a circumvention problem plagues not only
the leveling-down approach but these leveling-up approaches as well. If we
succeed in equalizing election spending, either by leveling up or down, the
74. Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, 20 POL. &
SOC'Y 393, 424 (1992). Such a move also finds theoretical grounding in the work of political
scientists in the "power resource" school. See generally KoRPi, supra note 1o; JOHN D.
STEPHENS, THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM (1979); David Bradley et al.,
Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies, 55 WORLD POL. 193 (2003).




political power that comes from wealth will be exercised through lobbying; if
we succeed in equalizing lobbying spending, by leveling up or down, that
power will be exercised through some other means.76
While elections and lobbying are processes through which political power
can be expressed, organization, like wealth, is itself a source of political power.
This distinction matters enormously. As we have seen, political reforms that
restructure processes of participation but that leave background power
asymmetries untouched can be undone by circumvention. Political reform
aimed at organizational capacity is less apt to suffer this problem because it
enables groups to build political power that, like power derived from wealth, is
portable across processes of participation. A well-organized political group can
mobilize voters and influence elections; it can lobby and influence legislation;
it can buy media time and influence public opinion; and so on. Organization
can therefore countervail wealth's power irrespective of whether that power is
expressed through elections, lobbying, media, or any other avenue.
An organizational approach to redressing representational skew is not only
well grounded theoretically, but also recommended by the empirical realities of
current democratic practice in the United States. Again, Gilens's study is
illuminating. As discussed, Gilens finds skew in the responsiveness of policy to
different income groups. But Gilens also finds an exception to this general rule
when the balance of organized interest group power aligns with the policy
preferences of the poor and middle class. Thus, unlike the other policy
domains he studied, when it came to certain social welfare policies - including
Social Security, Medicare, school vouchers, and public works spending - Gilens
found no evidence that the policy preferences of the poor and middle-class
suffered when those preferences diverged from those of the affluent.7 The
reason, Gilens suggests, is that on these questions "poor and middle-income
Americans have powerful allies that tend to share their preferences." 7 Those
allies are organized interest groups.79
Gilens thus observes empirically what the preceding discussion predicts
theoretically: organization can compensate for the effects of wealth because it
operates as an independent source of political power.so When the balance of
76. Cf Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics ofParty Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 146-
49 (005) (discussing similar hydraulic effects in the context of regulating political parties).
77. See GILENS, supra note 1, at 121-22.
78. Id. at 121.
79. See id. at 121, 157-58.
so. Id. at 7 ("Interest groups form an essentially parallel channel of influence over government
policy.").
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organized interest group power aligns with the preferences of the wealthy, as it
generally does, the affluent's preferences gain even more policy traction relative
to the preferences of the poor and middle class. But where organized interests
reflect the preferences of the poor and middle class, organization reduces
representational inequality.
II. UNIONS AND REPRESENTATIONAL INEQUALITY
A. Unions and Politics
Among the interest groups operating in the United States today, the
"strongest positive associations between [the] groups' [policy] positions and
the preferences of the less well-off' are found in labor unions."' Across a range
of issues, unions' policy positions are highly correlated with those expressed by
individuals in the bottom nine income deciles." This should come as no
surprise: the income profile of union membership resembles the population
that Gilens's work reveals to be lacking in political influence. In fact, more than
eighty-five percent of union members fall into the "non-affluent" income
categories against which policy responsiveness is currently skewed.3
Given that organization constitutes a non-wealth-dependent source of
political influence, and given unions' ability to organize and advocate for the
policy preferences of the poor and middle class, unions are a clear source of
political influence for these sectors of the polity. In fact, in the United States,
unions have managed to organize lower- and middle-class Americans for
S. Id. at 157.
82. Id.
83. As of March 2011, approximately 85.8% of union members lived in households representing
the lower nine income deciles for U.S. households. This estimate was calculated from a
publicly available microdata set drawn from the Current Population Survey that was
conducted jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and Department of Labor in March 2011. See
Miriam King et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version
3.0, U. MINN. (2010), http://cps.ipums.org. The estimate is based on (1) the total money
income during the previous calendar year of all adult household members and (2) whether,
as part of his or her current job, at least one income earner is a member of a labor union.
The household income data was further divided into deciles, which ranged from roughly
$12,000 to $139,000 for all U.S. households in 2011. As outlined in the IPUMS
documentation, individual survey weights were used to ensure that the estimates are as
representative of the U.S. population as possible. (The author thanks Travis Coan for his
assistance with these calculations.) As Gilens concludes, "poor and middle-class Americans
would be even less likely to find their preferences reflected in federal policy were it not for




political action in numbers unmatched by any other non-party actor. At their
peak, unions represented more than one-third of wage-earners in the
country, and counted twenty-one million workers as members.s
Historically, unions have mobilized their memberships for various forms of
political action. They have, to start, done well registering and increasing voter
turnout among lower- and middle-class workers. One early review of the
literature concluded that union members were sixteen percent more likely to
vote than unorganized workers with similar occupations, education, income,
and status,8 6 and subsequent studies agree that union members turn out for
elections at disproportionately high rates.7 Unions have also contributed
substantial sums to candidates and parties," built effective lobbying
operations,' and engaged in extensive independent political advertising
campaigns.90 Unions, moreover, have funded this political activity with small-
dollar voluntary contributions from members. To take just one example,
84. MAYER, supra note 19, at 12 ("As a percent of wage and salary employment ... union
membership peaked in 1954 at 34.8%.").
85. Id. at lo ("The number of union members peaked in 1979 at an estimated 21.0 million.").
86. Harry M. Scoble, Organized Labor in Electoral Politics: Some Questions for the Discipline, 16 W.
POL. Q. 666, 672 (1963).
87. See, e.g., John Thomas Delaney et al., Unionism and Voter Turnout, 9 J. LAB. RES. 221, 232
(1988) (finding that union members were 14.5% more likely than their peers to vote in the
1978 national general elections); Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Unions, Voter Turnout,
and Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1964-2004, 69 J. POL. 430 (2007) (attributing increased
class bias in the U.S. electorate to decreased union membership and strength, in part
because union members are more likely to get to the polls); Benjamin Radcliff, Organized
Labor and Electoral Participation in American National Elections, 22 J. LAB. RES. 405, 411 (2001)
(reporting that, among other things, regression analysis of voter turnout data for national
elections from 1950 through 1994 showed a direct correlation between union membership
and voter turnout); Richard B. Freeman, What Do Unions Do . .. to Voting? 3 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9992, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers
/w9992.pdf (reporting that union members were 10-13% more likely to vote than non-
members in general but only 4% more likely to vote than non-members with comparable
characteristics).
88. See, e.g., Marick F. Masters & John T. Delaney, Organized Labor's Political Scorecard, 36 J.
LAB. RES. 365, 376-79 (2005) (documenting trends in union political contributions from
1990 to 2002).
89. See, e.g., WILLIAM FORM, SEGMENTED LABOR, FRACTURED POLITICS: LABOR POLITICS IN
AMERICAN LIFE 300-04 (1995) (describing labor's lobbying operations in the early 1990s).
go. See, e.g., Lili Levi, Plan B for Campaign-Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American
Politics After Citizens United?, 61 CATH. U. L. REv. 97, 167 (2011) (noting that labor unions
are "taking an increased role" in funding political advertising); Ralph K. Winter, The
History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 93, 1o n.34 (1997) ("Organized labor
has recently engaged in heavy political advertising . . .. ").
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political contributions to the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) -
perhaps the most politically active union in the nation and one that spent
approximately $23 million on the last election cycle -average seven dollars per
month. 9'
Although it is difficult to measure with precision, it is also clear that union
organization has had a significant impact on American policymaking.9 2
Numerous historical case studies support the point. In the 1940s, the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) had such a significant role in policymaking
that President Roosevelt is rumored to have instructed his advisors to "[c]lear
it with Sidney [Hillman]"-the CIO's political director-before moving on
major political or policy initiatives.93 In the 196os, according to historian
Nelson Lichtenstein, labor played a central role in shaping the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 9 in particular in ensuring that Title VII was included in the final bill.9 5
Indeed, the Act's passage depended in large measure upon labor's power to
turn out legislative votes.96 As Representative Richard Bolling, one of the Act's
leading supporters, put it, "We never would have passed the Civil Rights Act
without labor. They had the muscle; the other civil rights groups did not."9 7
The enactment of Medicare the following year obeyed a similar logic: labor was
"the most powerful single source of pressure" among supporters in the
legislative struggle.9' And unions have been the primary force behind changes
gi. Contribute to SEIU COPE, SERV. EMP. INT'L UNION, https://action.seiu.org/page/contribute
/cope (last visited Aug. 11, 2013); see also Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Service Employees
International Union, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending
/detail.php?cmte=Service%2oEmployees%2OInternational%2oUnion&cycle=2o12 (last
visited Aug. 11, 2013) (reporting that SEIU spent $23,011,004 on the 2012 federal election
cycle, 83.8% of which was spent in the general election).
92. Thus Harry Scoble, writing in 1963, reported that "the most fundamental postwar change in
the structure and process of political parties has been the entrance of organized labor into
electoral activity." Scoble, supra note 86, at 666.
93. STEVEN FRASER, LABOR WILL RULE: SIDNEY HILLMAN AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN LABOR 526
(1991); see also id. at 495-539.
94. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT: WALTER REUTHER AND
THE FATE OF AMERICAN LABOR 387-88 (1995).
95. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 192 (2002).
96. See TAYLOR E. DARK, THE UNIONS AND THE DEMOCRATS: AN ENDURING ALLIANCE 57 (1999);
J. DAVID GREENSTONE, LABOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 339-43 (1969).
97. DARK, supra note 96, at 57.
ga. THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 18 (2d ed. 2000); accord DARK, supra
note 96, at 57; TRACY ROOF, AMERICAN LABOR, CONGRESS, AND THE WELFARE STATE, 1935-




in federal minimum wage policy since the enactment of the Fair Labor
Standards Act in 1938.99
Finally, quantitative data corroborate the case-study evidence of union
influence. In one of the foundational studies in the field, Richard B. Freeman
and James L. Medoff showed that federal legislators representing well-
organized states in the 1970s were more likely to "vote union" -that is, vote in
harmony with the expressed preferences of the AFL-CIO-than their peers
from less well-organized jurisdictions. 0o Subsequent scholarship confirms this
correlation between union density and legislative voting in favor of the unions'
policy positions."o' Further, in the states, relative union density accounts for
significant variations in social welfare, education, and tax policy,'o2 and greater
union density correlates with more rigorous state statutory protections for
workers.o 3
B. Organizing Through Work
There are numerous reasons why unions were successful in organizing low-
and middle-income groups but one is particularly relevant to the analysis here:
labor law enabled unions to take advantage of the workplace (in particular) and
the employment relationship (more generally) as loci of organizational activity.
As this Section will discuss, workplace organizing offers a number of
g. BARTELS, supra note 1, at 24o (discussing union influence on minimum wage policy); see also
Farrell E. Bloch, Political Support for Minimum Wage Legislation, 1 J. LAB. RES. 245 (1980)
(finding that senators favoring the passage of minimum wage bills are more likely to come
from states with high union membership); Farrell E. Bloch, Political Support for Minimum
Wage Legislation: 1989, 14 J. LAB. RES. 187 (1993) (same).
100. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONs Do? 195-98 (1984).
1o1. Leo H. Kahane, Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Analysis, 55 AM. J.
ECON. & Soc. 395, 4o6 (1996) (concluding that union density affects senators' votes but not
representatives' votes); Masters & Delaney, supra note 88, at 374 (citing Janet M. Box-
Steffensmeier et al., The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 324(1997)).
102. See, e.g., Michael Patrick Allen & John L. Campbell, State Revenue Extraction from Diferent
Income Groups: Variations in Tax Progressivity in the United States, 1916 to 1986, 59 AM. Soc.
REV. 169 (1994) (finding that labor organization correlates with tax progressivity);
Benjamin Radcliff& Martin Saiz, Labor Organization and Public Policy in the American States,
60 J. POL. 113 (1998) (finding that higher rates of unionization induce greater spending on
Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits, total per pupil expenditures in K-12
education, and state-level tax progressivity).
103. Richard B. Freeman, Unionism and Protective Labor Legislation, 39 PROC. INDUS. REL. RES.
Ass'N 260, 262-65 (1987).
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advantages that allowed unions to overcome what might otherwise have been
insurmountable hurdles to collective action. And, as this Section will also
discuss, labor law allowed unions to harness these advantages through several
relatively modest, but critical, interventions.
First, interpersonal relationships and social networks are important
facilitators of organizational and political activity. 04 Work often is a rich source
of such relationships and networks,ss and can serve as an especially viable
platform for organizing.'o6 In a similar vein, organizing depends on the
development of a collective identity among participants. o Again, work can -
and often does -provide the basis for such an identity. As Robert MacKenzie
puts it, "[t]he shared experience of work is a strong influence over the creation
of social collectivity. Work as a collective experience ... may act as a basis for
group identity."'
More tangibly, though no less importantly, the workplace is an important
geographic site for organizing, a centralized location where employees gather as
a group and where they can be reached as a group. Thus, the significant costs
of identifying and contacting employees, who are otherwise dispersed across
potentially large geographic areas, can be avoided when the workplace is
available for organizational purposes.'09 Here, labor law has made an important
contribution: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) allows employees to
use the workplace as a centralized location for organizing by granting
employees the right to speak with one another about unionization in non-work
areas of the workplace and during non-work time."o These same rules also
enable employees to speak to one another about, and encourage each other to
participate in, a certain range of political activity in the workplace."' For many
104. See, e.g., Chaeyoon Lim, Social Networks and Political Participation: How Do Networks Matter,
87 Soc. FORCES 961, 961 (20o8) (collecting sources).
ios. See, e.g., Diana C. Mutz & Jeffrey J. Mondak, The Workplace as a Context for Cross-Cutting
Political Discourse, 68 J. POL. 140, 141 (20o6).
106. See VERBA ET AL., supra note ii, at 145 (reporting that political recruitment requests made,
inter alia, through the workplace have a "relatively high probability of success").
107. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2725
(20o8).
1o8. Robert MacKenzie et al., 'All that is Solid?': Class, Identity and the Maintenance of a Collective
Orientation Amongst Redundant Steelworkers, 40 Soc. 833, 836 (20o6).
og. When an employer does not have a single geographic home-homecare work is an excellent
example -labor law cannot offer such a locus for organizational activity.
no. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
iii. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that employers must permit employees to urge other




years after the enactment of the NLRA, moreover, labor law also allowed non-
employee union organizers to speak with employees at their worksites.m'
Next, work has proved a fruitful locus for organizing because the
employment relationship enabled unions to solve one of the more dogged
problems in organizational development: the need for an administrable and
sustainable financing mechanism. In short, the employer's payroll system
provides a channel through which dues payments can be made by employees to
the union automatically and on a recurring basis. Here, again, a modest legal
intervention has been important: the NLRA makes payroll deductions for
union dues a mandatory subject of bargaining" and treats an employer's
refusal to agree to payroll deduction as evidence of a failure to bargain in good
faith. 14 In some states, dues payments can be required as a condition of
employment; in other states - so-called right-to-work states - dues can only be
collected from employees who wish to join the union. But in either setting, the
legislation, so long as the issues around which the political organizing takes place implicate
employees' status as employees. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). The point
here is not that the current statute would protect all the types of political activity that
political unions would engage in. See Local 174, UAW v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (holding the distribution of a political leaflet to be unprotected because "the
principal thrust of the leaflet was to induce employees to vote for specific candidates, not to
educate them on political issues relevant to their employment conditions"); see also NLRB v.
Motorola, Inc., 991 F.2d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that political activities in support
of an "outside political organization" are not protected by the NLRA). The point, rather, is
that the current statute requires employers to tolerate-during non-work time and in non-
work areas of the workplace -employee speech about politics that are related to the
underlying statutory protections. An unbundled regime would need to expand the range of
political speech protected, but would not need to expand the times and places that such
speech is permitted.
112. See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485, 494 (1954), enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955), affd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956); see also
Estlund, supra note 22, at 314-15. As discussed below, rights of access for non-employee
organizers were essentially extinguished by Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, S02 U.S. 527 (1992).
113. See Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (ist Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
114. See H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965), enforced, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This
is particularly true where the employer allows payroll deductions for other purposes. See
Farmers Coop. Gin Ass'n, 161 N.L.R.B. 887 (1966). An illustrative example of the function
played by dues checkoff is provided by MTA Bus Co. v. Transp. Workers Union ofAm., No.
2005-37468, 2005 WL 6242982 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (Affidavit of Roger Toussaint, Sept. 18,
2007), cited in Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of20u, 27 ABAJ.
LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 297 n.21 (2012). For a discussion of public sector analogues, see, for
example, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977) and Chicago Teachers
Union, Local No. i v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
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statute permits unions to harness the employer's payroll system as a method of
dues deduction. 5
Employers also constitute a centralized source of information about
employees, information that is important for organizing. Specifically, because
it is often necessary for organizers to speak with employees outside of the
workplace -particularly if there is no centralized geographic workplace-
unionization requires that organizers be able to identify who the workforce
is."' Here, the NLRA grants union organizers the right to access the
employer's list of employee names, addresses, and-potentially-phone
numbers and email addresses." 7 Particularly in larger bargaining units, this
grant of access to the employer's informational resources reduces what could
otherwise be prohibitive information costs."'
us. Importantly, moreover, unions are entitled to use dues deducted from payroll for both
collective bargaining purposes and political purposes as long as employees consent to such
use. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 8oo, 811-19 (2012).
It should be said here that the contemporary significance of voluntary dues deduction
is less clear than it was historically. Specifically, the availability of consumer credit cards and
electronic debiting systems provides unions with a potential substitute for payroll
deduction: with the employee's consent, unions can secure monthly payments from a credit
card or a bank draft instead of from the employer's payroll. Although some unions have
struggled to make such technology work in low-wage sectors of the economy, some union
leaders see a potential advantage to automatic credit card or bank drafts over payroll
deductions because of the way these newer forms of payment can reduce the union's need to
rely on employer cooperation. See Email from Keith Kelleher, President, SEIU Healthcare
Ill. & Ind. (July 19, 2012) (on file with author).
116. As discussed infra note 122, non-employee union organizers today almost never have the
right to access company property for organizational purposes. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
502 U.S. 527 (1992); see also Estlund, supra note 22 (discussing Lechmere).
117. Under the so-called Excelsior rule, when a union garners the support of thirty percent of the
relevant workforce, it is entitled to the employer's list of contact information for all
employees relevant to the organizing drive. See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236
(1966). In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the NLRB proposed to expand the
information to which unions are entitled to include phone numbers and email addresses. See
Representation-Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812, 36,820, 36,837-38 (proposed June
22, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 102.62). The proposed rule has been enjoined by a
district court on the ground that the Board lacked a quorum to enact the rule. See Chamber
of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2012). A similar decision by
the D.C. Circuit is currently before the Supreme Court. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S.
Ct. 2861 (2013) (granting certiorari).
11s. For a description of the costs involved in gathering employee contact information when an
Excelsior list is not available, see, for example, Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Labor Law
Access Rules and Stare Decisis: Developing A Planned Parenthood-Based Model of Reform, 20




Finally, labor law compounds the advantages of the workplace as a site for
organizing by making employer retaliation for such activity illegal. Section 7 of
the NLRA gives employees the affirmative right to "form, join, or assist labor
organizations," and Section 8(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization."' 9 Accordingly, if an employee is penalized for union
activity, the employer faces unfair labor practice liability and the employee is
entitled to an appropriate remedy (including reinstatement and back pay). As
Richard Posner explains: "The efforts of an employee to induce his fellows to
[unionize] would often, in the absence of legal protection ... be set at naught
by the employer's firing him."2 o By making such actions illegal, the law denies
the employer "the natural advantage that he would have, as one facing many,
in fending off organizing activities."1
With respect to both workplace access and anti-retaliation protections, the
robustness of these legal rights has declined rather dramatically in recent years.
For example, the Court has curtailed access rights for nonemployee union
122anthN
organizers, and the National Labor Relations Board's ability to remedy anti-
union retaliation has declined as a result of both Court intervention and
inadequate enforcement resources.312  The prevailing view is that the
curtailment of these legal protections has contributed to the decline in unions'
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (2006). The statute similarly makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise" of employees'
Section 7 rights. Id. 5 158 (a)(i).
12o. Posner, supra note 28, at 994.
121. Id. at 995.
122. At various times, the NLRB has upheld the right of such organizers to use employer
property- generally in outside areas like parking lots-to discuss unionization with
employees. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co., 1o9 N.L.R.B. 485, 485 (1954), enforcement denied
sub nom. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955), affd, 351 U.S. 105
(1956); Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). Such access rights were helpful to the
organizational process because, as the Supreme Court explained, the right to unionize
"depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and
disadvantages of organization from others." Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 492
n.9 (1978). In 1992, however, the Court curtailed the circumstances in which nonemployee
organizers can access employees on company property, essentially limiting the right to
remote logging camps or mines. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
123. See Sachs, supra note 107, at 2694-95.
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organizational success.'24 The point here, however, is simply that the right to
use the workplace and the employment relationship for organizational activity,
along with protections against retaliation, help employees overcome
impediments to collective action and serve as important facilitators of
organizational activity. The stronger those rights, and the more robust their
enforcement, the more effective they are at facilitating such activity.
A word is also in order here about a role that labor law does not play in
facilitating organizational success. Among the traditional impediments to
collective action, the problem of free riding is central."2 Labor law does provide
unions with a mechanism for dealing with part of the free-rider problem.
Under the NLRA, collective bargaining agreements can require that all
employees who are represented by the union pay dues to cover the union's
collective bargaining and contract administration expenses.12' But labor law's
resolution of the free-rider problem is limited in a way that is relevant here: the
law does not entitle unions to overcome free riding with respect to political
activity.'2 7 This, of course, is the free-rider threat that political unions would
face, and the success that workers historically have had in organizing for
political action suggests that they have been able to overcome this free-rider
threat even though labor law has not given them a mechanism for doing so.
C. Collective Bargaining and Union Decline
In part due to unions' ability to take advantage of the workplace as a locus
of organizational activity, unions historically have been an effective political
124. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 113-14 (1990) (discussing the debate
over whether already illegal forms of employer resistance to union representation have
affected the success of representation campaigns).
125. Indeed, in Mancur Olson's account of the free-rider problem, the labor union was the
primary case study, and union organizing has long been understood to present a classic free-
rider threat. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEcTIvE ACTION 66-91 (1971).
126. See 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(3) (2006); see also Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(3) in this way); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union
Security Agreements Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and
the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 51 (1990) (discussing Beck and union
security agreements); Sachs, supra note 115, at 811-19 (same). In right-to-work states, such
agreements are illegal.
127. Thus, although a collective bargaining agreement can require all employees to make dues
payments, those mandatory payments may be used only for collective bargaining and
contract administration expenses. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 745; Sachs, supra note 115, at 813-19.





voice for the poor and middle class. The problem, from the perspective of
representational equality, is that unionization rates have been falling
consistently across the last several decades and have now fallen to levels not
seen since before the Wagner Act was passed in 1935." Scholars have devoted
significant attention recently to the consequences for American politics of this
decline in unionization rates. 9 Nearly all-including Gilens, Bartels, Hacker
and Pierson, and Schlozman et al. -point to the decline in union strength as a
major explanation for the growth in representational inequality.o Hacker and
Pierson summarize the consensus this way:
No group better captures the mid-century influence of voluntary
organizations representing middle- and working-class Americans than
i28. Union density was 11.5% in 1934. See Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining
Moments and Social Processes 58 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6012,
1997), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6o2.pdf. In 2012, less than 7% of private sector
workers were members of a labor union. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population
Survey: Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry,
BUREAU LAB. STATS. (2012), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat42.htm (last updated Feb. 5,
2013). Membership levels in public sector unions have not, at least until recently, been on a
similar decline. See id.
129. Labor scholars have been writing about union decline for decades. See, e.g., Cynthia L.
Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2002) ("The
ineffectuality of American labor law, and the shrinking scope of collective representation and
collective bargaining, is partly traceable to the law's 'ossification.'"); Gottesman, supra note
22, at 61 ("[T]he system of collective bargaining that the NLRA promotes is invoked by an
ever-shrinking percentage of American workers. At latest count, less than twelve percent of
the workers covered by the NLRA are union-represented. 'Our national labor policy' is not
serving eighty-eight percent of America's workers." (footnotes omitted)); Paul Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1769, 1769 (1983) ("Contemporary American labor law more and more resembles an
elegant tombstone for a dying institution. While administrators, judges, lawyers, and
scholars busy themselves with sophisticated jurisprudential refinements of the legal
framework for collective bargaining, the fraction of the work force actually engaged in
collective bargaining is steadily declining.").
130. BARTELS, supra note 1, at 24o (attributing the failure of lawmakers to raise the minimum
wage despite public support for doing so to, in part, the decline of organized labor); GILENS,
supra note I, at 158; HACKER & PIERSON, supra note I, at 142; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note
1, at 325-26; Radcliff & Saiz, supra note 102, at 122. Sociologists Bruce Western and Jake
Rosenfeld similarly report that the decline in private sector union membership between 1973
and 2007-a period of time when membership rates fell from 34% to 8%-has led to a
"dissipat[ion]" of unions' political power. Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms,
and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. Soc. REv. 513, 513, 533 (2011); see also Steven
Greenhouse, Labor's Decline and Wage Inequality, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIx (Aug. 4,
2011, 11:30 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.con/2oll/o8/o4/labors-decline-and-wage
-inequality (summarizing the Western and Rosenfeld study).
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organized labor. . . . [But] as unions shifted from confident
involvement in politics to embattled defense of their ever-smaller
pocket of the workforce, they also ceased to be able, or always willing,
to play the role as champions of the broad middle class they had carved
out in their heyday.131
There is a long-running debate over the specific causes of this decline in
unionization.1 3 2 The leading theories point to increasing competitiveness of
product markets,'3 3 shifts in production methods and systems of work
organization,'3 and managerial opposition to unionization. 35 Fortunately, we
need not attempt to resolve this debate here because all of the leading theories
place collective bargaining at the center of the story of union decline. It might
be that collective bargaining raises wages and benefits above competitive levels
and thereby puts unionized employers at a competitive disadvantage vis-4-vis
non-union firms in newly competitive markets.' 6^ It might be that collective
bargaining imposes a set of inflexible work rules that stand in the way of
much-needed flexibility. 3 Or it might be that, given both of the above,
collective bargaining inspires deep managerial hostility to the union project.138
131. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note i, at 142; see also id. at 303 ("[T]he organizations that
traditionally bolstered middle-class democracy have declined. Nowhere is this clearer or
more fateful than with regard to American labor."). These authors accordingly see a
revitalized union movement as a way to remedy political inequality, but they despair of the
prospects for such revitalization. For example, Gilens argues that unions "would appear to
be among the most promising interest group bases for strengthening the policy influence of
American's poor and middle class," but the decline in unionization rates leads him to
conclude that "unions' success in these efforts is likely to be fairly limited." GILENS, supra
note 1, at 158. Hacker and Pierson concur. They argue that "[a]n expanded role for unions
would make a big difference" in remedying representational skew, but that "the
reinvigoration of unions is unlikely to be the primary catalyst during the early stages of a
renewed middle-class politics." HACKER& PIERSON, supra note 1, at 303.
132. As noted supra note 128, public sector unions have fared far better than private sector unions
over the last several decades. The following discussion thus tracks the decline in private
sector unionization rates, a decline that accounts for the entire overall drop in unionization
levels.
133. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 3, 5 n.5 (1993); Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a
Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 581 (2007).
134. See STONE, supra note 17.
135. See WELER, supra note 124, at 113-14.
136. See Estreicher, supra note 133, at 12-14; Wachter, supra note 133, at 585.
137. See STONE, supra note 17, at 196-216.




But, whatever the mechanism, the consensus view is that unions are in
decline -largely, if not entirely- because of their collective bargaining
function.' 9
To see this, take the concern about increasingly competitive markets. The
argument is a plausible one and asserts that unions were able to thrive at a
moment in U.S. history when markets were nearly oligopolistic. 40 As markets
globalized and became increasingly competitive, however, collective
bargaining-which drove up labor costs at unionized firms -undermined the
ability of union employers to compete with non-union ones. The result was
significant loss of market share for unionized companies and dramatic declines
in unionization rates.'
139. Two caveats are worth noting. First, according to the "substitution hypothesis," part of the
decline in unionization rates is attributable to unions' political success. The argument is that
because of increasingly worker-friendly regulation of the economy-in part the product of
past union political power -unions as collective bargaining agents are no longer as necessary
as they once were. See, e.g., James T. Bennett & Jason E. Taylor, Labor Unions: Victims of
Their Political Success?, 22 J. LAB. RES. 261, 261 (2001); Wachter, supra note 133, at 585.
Whatever the plausibility of this argument, the substitution hypothesis still places collective
bargaining at the center of the story of union decline. That is, the hypothesis holds that
unions' political success makes unions qua collective bargaining agents no longer necessary.
But, relevant for our purposes, the hypothesis does not hold that unions' past political
success renders unions qua political agents obsolete.
Second, some scholars contend that cultural or intellectual shifts have contributed to
the decline of unionization rates in the United States. Most prominent among these theories
is the idea that the collectivism inherent in unionism is counter to the cultural ascendancy of
individualism. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War
Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4
(1999) (discussing the effect of the ascendancy of individual over collective rights).
Assuming there is truth to these arguments, however, it is difficult to know which aspect of
unionism - the collective-bargaining function or the political one - has created these cultural
problems. Qualitative accounts suggest that the problem may lie with the collective
bargaining function. See, e.g., LAWRENCE RICHARDS, UNION-FREE AMERICA 93-124 (2008).
Moreover, it would be something of a strange claim to assert that political action in the
United States must be individualistic in order to enjoy cultural or popular support-strange
because organization is in the nature of political action, and our primary political actors,
parties, are collective ones. Finally, even if some degree of union decline can be explained by
cultural opposition to unions' political function, collective bargaining still clearly provides
much of the explanation.
140. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Labor Policy in Late Twentieth Century Capitalism: New Paradoxes
for the Democratic State, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 89-91 (1997).
141. See Wachter, supra note 133. The classic example offered for this story is the U.S. auto
industry. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust
Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 66-67 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate
Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1463, 1467-68 (2001); Thomas Lifson, Oligopoly and the Fall of
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Or take the concern about the changing nature of work. As Katherine Stone
documents, the era of mass industrial production was one in which
"[e]mployers sought uniformity in products and processes in order to achieve
economies of scale.""' These production processes lent themselves to narrow
job definitions and long-term employment relationships.14 In this setting,
according to Stone's account, collective bargaining agreements that enforced
rigid job rules and strict seniority rights made sense. But because our economy
is no longer defined by mass production industries organized in this fashion,
Stone argues, unions' insistence that collective bargaining agreements dictate
work rules, seniority protections, and the like is out of place.'"
Finally, take managerial opposition to unionization. Although there is some
debate about the specifics, the prevalence, ferocity, and effectiveness of
managerial opposition to unionization is well established. In one prominent
study, for example, employers engaged in anti-union efforts in 96% of the
union organizing campaigns they faced;45 in another study, the opposition rate
was 98.4%.46 In about half of all union campaigns, moreover, employers
threaten to close the business should employees choose to unionize.147
Employers also fire between 5% and 20% of active union supporters.4' Not
surprisingly, these tactics work: when management threatens to close the
business or fires union supporters, union win rates decline significantly.149
Even where there is a successful unionization campaign, moreover,
management frequently engages in efforts to avoid concluding a collective
bargaining agreement. These tactics, also often successful, have further
the American Automobile Industry, AM. THINKER (Nov. 19, 20o8), http://www
.americanthinker.conV2oo8/n/oligopoly-and the fallofthe.html.
142. STONE, supra note 17, at 5.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 203. Stone provides a long list of collective bargaining clauses that are, in her telling,
"antithetical" to the new "boundaryless" organization of work. See id. at 204-05.
145. Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition to
Organizing, EcON. POL'Y INST. lo tbl. 3 (May 20, 2009), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/pdf
/bp235.pdf.
146. See Chirag Mehta & Nik Theodore, Undermining the Right to Organize:
Employer Behavior During Union Representation Campaigns, AM. RTs. AT WORK
8 (Dec. 2005), http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports
/UROCUEDcompressedfullreport.pdf (reporting that sixty-one out of sixty-two
representation campaigns had employer opposition).
147. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 145, at 1o tbl.3.
148. See Sachs, supra note 16, at 684.




contributed to the decline in unionization rates as initial union organizing
victories fail to become institutionalized and lead instead to the decertification
of the union as the employees' bargaining representative.so
Managerial opposition to unionization has everything to do with collective
bargaining. In fact, management opposes unions for two primary reasons: one,
to secure competitive labor costs, and, two, to maintain control over the way
work is organized and carried out."s' Collective bargaining agreements can
impede both of these managerial objectives. First, collective bargaining often
requires unionized firms to pay more in labor costs than their non-union
competitors.s2 Second, as Stone's work emphasizes, collective bargaining also
often restricts managerial control over the workplace. Thus, for example,
iso. See Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free
Choice Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47, 56 (2009). As Fisk and Pulver explain:
An employer determined to resist the lawful right of its employees to unionize
and bargain collectively can thwart their rights simply by refusing to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement. Eventually, after the employer drags out the
negotiations for years and makes plain its refusal to enter into an agreement with
the union, the employees or the union give up. The employer can then withdraw
recognition and remain union-free.
Id.
isi. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the
National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEx. L. REV. 921, 946-64 (1993); John Logan, The Union
Avoidance Industry in the United States, 44 BIuT. J. INDUS. REL. 651, 663 (20o6).
152. Thus, collective bargaining brings with it a rather substantial "wage premium," which has
been at about seventeen percent. See David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do
Unions Have on Wages Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, in WHAT Do
UNIONs Do? A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 79 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds.
2008); David Card, The Effect of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A Longitudinal Analysis, 64
ECONOMETRICA 957, 974 (1996).
Unionized jobs are also more likely to provide health insurance, defined-benefit
pension plans, vacation pay, life insurance, and disability insurance. See John W. Budd, The
Effect of Unions on Employee Benefits and Non-Wage Compensation: Monopoly Power, Collective
Voice, and Facilitation, in WHAT Do UNIONs Do? A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE, supra, at
16o, 177-81. At times, and in certain industries, non-union firms will increase their
compensation packages to avoid the likelihood that they too will become unionized. See
Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 130, at 517 (reviewing the literature and concluding that
the threat effect, which "results from nonunion employers raising wages to the union level
to avert the threat of unionization," is supported by evidence that "nonunion wages are
higher in highly unionized industries, localities, and firms"). This threat effect can reduce
the competitive disadvantage of unionization, but it does not eliminate it. The effect,
moreover, depends on the existence of an actual threat of unionization. As union strength
declines, so too does the salience of the threat effect. See id. at 532 (attributing rising income
inequality between 1973 and 2007, in part, to decreasing union density and the declining
threat effect).
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collective bargaining agreements generally include just-cause dismissal clauses
that restrict management's ability to discharge employees and thereby to
control how those employees behave.s The work rules contained in most
collective bargaining agreements have a similar effect: rather than allowing
management to determine how work at the firm is performed, these clauses
specify which workers are to perform which tasks and set out with some
precision how those tasks are to be performed. Seniority agreements, job-
bidding systems, bumping rights, and analogous collective bargaining clauses
likewise diminish managerial control over how the workplace is organized and
thereby fuel managerial opposition.'4
Collective bargaining has significant merits. Over the last half century, the
practice has been a key contributor to economic equality in the United States,s5s
and collective bargaining helps correct market failures that plague individual
employment contracting. S6 But, as the above discussion makes clear, collective
bargaining is also a central factor in each of the primary explanations for the
decline of unions.
III. THE UNBUNDLED UNION: LIBERATING POLITICS FROM
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The last Part argued that collective bargaining has, for a number of reasons,
made it difficult for traditional unions to thrive under contemporary
conditions. But because unions' political and collective bargaining functions
are bundled, all of the collective-bargaining-related reasons for unions'
decline - that is to say, essentially all of the reasons for union decline - are also
impediments to workers' ability to use unions as a vehicle for political
organizing. Bundling, in short, holds unions' political-organizational
capabilities captive to the fortunes of collective bargaining.
Because unions' political and collective bargaining functions are bundled, a
resurgence of traditional unions would increase the political voice of lower-
and middle-income groups.'1 But rehabilitating unions as a vehicle for political
153. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594,594-95-
154. See STONE, supra note 17, at 204-05.
1ss. See Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 130. See generally FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 100,
at 43-60 (describing the ways in which unions contribute to economic equality).
is6. See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Nonns in the Internal Labor Market and the
Possible Failures ofIndividual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953 (1996).




organizing does not require a resurgence of traditional unions."' To the
contrary, political organizing can be advanced by unbundling the political and
collective bargaining functions of the union.
This is true for a reason that will now be obvious. In an unbundled regime,
the fact that collective bargaining can be incompatible with contemporary
forms of work organization, that it can create problems for firms operating in
modern markets, and that it inspires fierce managerial opposition would be
irrelevant to workers' political efforts because those efforts could now proceed
independently of collective bargaining. Unbundling, that is to say, would
immediately insulate political organizing efforts from the vulnerabilities of
collective bargaining. Unbundling would also expand the range of employees
for whom political organizing through the union form is a viable option. As we
have seen, employees who wish to organize politically through a union can do
so only if they also choose to organize for collective bargaining. But a
substantial portion of the U.S. labor force does not desire to bargain
collectively with their employers. 159 An unbundled regime would thus allow the
half of the labor force that does not want collective bargaining to take
advantage of the union as a political vehicle.
The third reason to predict that unbundling will facilitate political
organizing is the focus of this Part: namely, political unions would likely
generate less managerial opposition than traditional collective bargaining
unions generate. It is important to clarify at the outset, however, what this Part
does and does not argue. The argument here is that unbundling the union
would likely decrease-though not eliminate -managerial opposition to
employee organizing efforts. There are groups other than firm management
that oppose unions' political efforts. The Chamber of Commerce and the
National Right to Work Committee are prominent examples.16 0 More recently,
158. At least in the near term, such a resurgence is unlikely. The trends that have contributed to
unions' decline continue unabated, and the types of legal reforms that might reverse the
slide in union density have failed to secure the necessary support. The most recent example
is perhaps the starkest: at a time when the Democratic Party controlled the White House
and sixty seats in the Senate, a package of labor reforms designed to facilitate renewed union
growth - a bill that unions and pro-union legislators had sought for years - still failed to
pass. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, iith Cong. (2oo9); Sheryl Gay
Stolberg & Steven Greenhouse, Pace of Change Under Obama Frustrates Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/07/us/politics/o71abor.html. Indeed, the
most likely course for traditional unions in the coming years is further decline. See James J.
Brudney, Recrafting a Trojan Horse: Thoughts on Workplace Governance in Light of Recent
British Labor Law Developments, 28 CoMP. LAB. L. &POL'YJ. 193, 195 (2007).
isg. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 6.
160. See, e.g., Marick F. Masters, Raymond Gibney & Thomas J. Zagenczyk, Worker Pay
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individuals like the Koch brothers have played a similar role, sponsoring a 2012
ballot initiative in California that would have prohibited even voluntary dues
deductions for political purposes.'"' Many elected officials also oppose unions'
political efforts. Scott Walker, the Republican Governor of Wisconsin, is a
leading contemporary example."'
With respect to these groups and individuals, two points bear mention.
First, whether groups that oppose traditional unions would also oppose
political unions depends on what political unions end up doing. To the extent
that political unions replicate the political agendas of traditional unions, groups
like the Chamber of Commerce undoubtedly would continue their opposition.
But in a world where politics is unbundled from collective bargaining, it is
uncertain whether political unions would advance the same agendas as
traditional unions. As this Essay has noted, some political unions might choose
not to advance economic goals at all; in such cases, it is doubtful that the
Chamber of Commerce and groups like it would focus much energy on
opposing them.
The second point is that even if opposition by these groups remained
undiminished, it is still relevant that managerial opposition is likely to decline.
This is the case most generally because it would imply an overall decline in
opposition. More particularly, this is true because non-managerial actors lack
the set of resources that makes managerial opposition to union organizing so
Protection: Implications for Labor's Political Spending and Voice, 48 INDUS. REL. 557, 558 n.1, 562
(2009) (including the National Right to Work Committee among the "[kJey proponents
and instigators" of paycheck protection initiatives in the states); Gordon Lafer, The 'Paycheck
Protection' Racket: Tilting the Political Playing Field Toward Corporate Power and Away from
Working Americans, ECON. PouCY INST. 3 (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.epi.org
/files/2o13/paycheck-protection-racket-tilting-politicaLpdf ("The nation's largest corporate
lobbies -including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce . . . -have been promoting [paycheck
protection proposals] for at least the past 15 years in various states.").
161. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, California Is Latest Stage for Election Battle over Unions, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/202/1o/02/us/politics/battle-over-unions
-moves-to-california.html; Andy Stern, Analysis: Koch Brothers a Force in Anti-Union Effort,
REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2oil/o2/26/us-usa-wisconsin
-koch-idUSTRE71P28W2o1o226; Anthony York, Prop. 32: Group Linked to Koch Brothers
Gives $4 Million, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california
-politics/2o2/o9/group-with-koch-brothers-ties-gives-4-million-to-proposition-32.html.
162. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, G.O.P. Playorm Seeks to Weaken Powers of Unions, N.Y. TIMEs:
THE CAUCUS (Aug. 30, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.co/2oi2/08/30
/g-o-p-platform-seeks-to-weaken-powers-of-unions ("The 2012 [Republican Party]
platform urges elected officials across the country to change their laws regarding public-
sector unions and follow the lead of Wisconsin's governor, Scott Walker, who spearheaded




effective. Namely, these groups cannot fire employees who try to organize
unions, and they cannot threaten to close firms in response to organizing
drives. Only management can do that.
In addition to offering reasons to predict that unbundling will increase the
prospects for political organizing, this Part also offers some very preliminary
evidence that workers would organize political unions. The evidence consists of
union organizing campaigns that have been restricted to political action. The
Part also addresses more theoretically the question of whether union political
organizing can succeed when it is not connected to collective bargaining.
A. Improving Prospects for Organizing: Diminishing and Altering Managerial
Opposition
Management, to be sure, would sometimes oppose the formation of
political unions. But political unions would likely generate less pervasive and
less severe opposition than conventional unions do. The most basic reason for
this prediction is that, while traditional unions have a legal obligation to
bargain over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,"'
political unions might not choose to pursue public policies that impact the firm
at all. For example, while a traditional union must engage the firm over
economics, a political union would be entitled to focus entirely on social issues,
international affairs, public education, and the like. And while individual
managers might have positions on these issues, the union's advocacy of them
would likely not threaten the economic interests of the firm. It is also the case
that certain components of collective bargaining agreements that generate
managerial opposition would be difficult, if not impossible, to replicate
through political action: key examples are the work rules and job classifications
contained in many collective bargaining agreements, which, as Section II.C
explained, are understood to impede flexibility in work design.6 4
But even if political unions took on policy issues that impact the firm
directly, they would still likely engender less managerial opposition. This is the
163. See 29 U.S.C. § i5 8(d) (2006).
164. Indeed, scholars have argued that collective bargaining is superior to legislation for the
reason that collective bargaining, but not legislation, can establish specific rules for specific
firms. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPIACE 136 (2oo) ("Collective
bargaining is decentralized and non-state-centered, and it is potentially flexible, responsive
to local conditions and to changing needs, cooperative, and democratic. The New Deal
proponents of collective bargaining proclaimed its superiority to centralized regulation of
terms of employment .... .").
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case because political unions would have less power vis-1-vis the individual
firm than a collective bargaining union does. Collective bargaining unions
exercise collective power directly against the firm: they translate their ability to
threaten production-or to otherwise intervene in the firm's operations-into
bargaining concessions that the firm itself must grant. By contrast, a political
union would exercise its power through the political processes of some
government. And, even if all the employees in a given firm join a political
union, they would constitute only a small proportion of the voters in the
relevant polity. The result is a diminution in the relative ability of a particular
union to impact the individual firm where it is organized, a diminution that
should lessen the intensity of managerial opposition.
Of course, if political union organizing is successful, and if unions formed
at different firms were to affiliate, these unions could secure significant
political power. But managerial opposition to political unionism on these
grounds would be plagued by its own collective action problem. That is, even if
it would be in the collective long-term interests of multiple firm managements
to fight the development of individual political unions (because those unions
might eventually unite and exercise significant political power), the incentives
for individual managements to free-ride on the oppositional efforts of other
firms would be significant. This collective action problem would thus reduce
the likelihood that any particular firm's management would fight the
organization of any particular political union.
Political unions are also likely to generate less managerial opposition
because they are less likely to impose competitive disadvantages on their firms.
This is the case, in part, because collective bargaining generally takes place at
the firm level and political action by definition takes place at the level of a
polity that will encompass multiple firms and, at times, entire markets.' To
take a basic example: if a union, through collective bargaining, secures paid
sick leave for the employees of a grocery store chain in a given state, that chain
will face higher labor costs than, and be at a competitive disadvantage relative
to, all the other chains in the state (and relative to any chains that move into
the state to take advantage of the unionized firm's higher labor costs). If, on
the other hand, the union helps secure legislation requiring all employers in the
165. Collective bargaining agreements can be extended to cover multiple firms, but these are the
exception rather than the rule. See i THE DEVELOPING IABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE
COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 712-20 (John E. Higgens, Jr. ed., 5th ed.
20o6). It is also true that if unions successfully organize all the firms in a market, they can
take labor costs out of competition through collective bargaining. But, as the above
discussion showed, the increasing competitiveness of markets is making this more difficult




state to provide paid sick leave, then the sick leave requirement produces no
competitive disadvantage for any of the grocery stores in the state. In this
scenario, employers are likely to vigorously oppose the formation of the
collective bargaining union. They may also oppose the formation of a political
union-a legislated sick-leave requirement imposes costs, even if those costs
are borne by all the firms operating in the state. But because the political
outcome takes sick-leave costs out of competition, managerial opposition is
likely to be less intense.
Political action certainly can place firms at a competitive disadvantage
relative to others. Indeed, any legislation that imposes costs on some firms in a
market but not others-say, in-state manufacturers but not out-of-state
manufacturers -will have this effect. Nonetheless, even where politics has the
potential to impose competitive disadvantages on firms operating within the
domestic political boundaries, there are many contexts in which politics is less
likely to lead to these outcomes than is collective bargaining. This is so because
a broader set of interests are represented in the political process than in the
collective bargaining one. At the bargaining table, there are only two parties:
the union and the employer. The union is accountable to its current
membership, a dynamic that can lead the union to make bargaining demands
that improve current conditions at the expense of long-term
competitiveness.,66 Not given a place at the collective-bargaining table are the
many constituencies that may be negatively impacted by anti-competitive
demands made by the union: future employees who lose job opportunities,
other firms whose fortunes are linked to the unionized employer's, community
groups whose interests are connected to the success of the employer, and,
indeed, the broader polity interested in the tax base to which the employer
contributes.
In the political process, by contrast, there are multiple parties with multiple
constituencies. When union political organizing is successful, unions can at
most constitute one voice among these many others. Should a political union
seek legislation that has anti-competitive effects, it will therefore be opposed
not only by the firm but also by a host of other groups that would face the
negative consequences of anti-competitive legislation. Where these interests
166. Indeed, recent research in labor economics seems to confirm that collective bargaining leads
to a reduction in normal profits and growth. See Richard B. Freeman, What Do Unions Do?
The 2004 M-Brane Stringtwister Edition, in WHAT Do UNIONs Do? A TwENTY-YEAR
PERSPEcTIVE, supra note 152, at 607, 622-23-
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can outvote the union, proposals that the union might have won at the
bargaining table will fail to carry in the political environment.167
In sum, then, political unions may not implicate the firms' economic
interests at all. If they attempted to do so, their ability to negatively impact
those interests would be tempered by the diffuseness of their organizational
density (relative to the polity as a whole), by their need to build coalitions that
would include groups less willing to compromise firm competitiveness, and by
the fact that-should adequate coalitions be built-any political successes
would likely impact multiple firms in the relevant market, thereby lessening
anti-competitive effects.
It is worth addressing here the possibility that some firms would oppose
political unions on the ground that they would constitute a first step towards
the formation of a traditional union. For example, even though a political
union could not itself engage in collective bargaining, it might contribute to the
development of a collective identity among workers who previously lacked one
and thereby make the arguments for collective bargaining more compelling.'
A political union might also conceivably serve to whet the appetite of workers
for collective bargaining, making the possibility of bargaining directly with
management over terms and conditions of employment seem more
appealing.' 9 Or, more straightforwardly, the political union might make it
easier for workers to deal with the coordination costs of organizing a collective
bargaining union.
These arguments have some plausibility, but there are important
rejoinders. First, employees form many types of collectives that do not elicit
managerial opposition-and certainly not the type of opposition that
management exhibits toward collective-bargaining unions. When employees
167. It is possible to imagine political contexts in which union political power would be sufficient
to enact the same types of anti-competitive policies through legislation that would otherwise
be secured at the bargaining table. It is also possible that the union would sometimes be
joined in these efforts by certain constituencies, such as businesses that believed they would
benefit from the increased spending power that would come from higher wages. But the
dynamic described in the text likely helps explain why unions have been consistently
unsuccessful in securing legislation that is strictly in the interests of union members-they
have been unable to find coalition partners necessary to enact such legislation. See Freeman,
supra note 166, at 624-25; Masters & Delaney, supra note 88.
16. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 107, at 2725-29 (discussing the relationship between collective
identity and collective action in the workplace context).
169. Mark Barenberg discusses these points in the context of so-called company unions -those
dominated by management. Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of





form a book club or a softball team or a prayer group, we might predict that
these groups would contribute to the development of a collective identity or
make it easier to overcome the coordination costs of union organizing. Yet,
management does not routinely fire workers who take a lead role in organizing
these types of collectives. Second, while a political union might whet the
appetites of employees for collective bargaining, it could also have precisely the
opposite effect: it could satiate -or deflect-the workforce's collective impulse,
thereby making the formation of a collective bargaining union less likely.'
Indeed, management itself often establishes forms of collective organization
within the workplace- self-managing production teams, employee
involvement committees, and the like-in an attempt to "deflect workers'
group choice over workplace governance modes . . . away from . . . full
collective bargaining.""'
A recent study by John Godard and Carola Frege sheds light on this
issue."' Godard and Frege conducted a survey of a thousand U.S. workers and
investigated, inter alia, whether the presence of certain non-union forms of
employee representation in the workplace impacted the propensity of workers
to join a traditional union.'73 The researchers asked workers whether "there
[was] a nonunion, management-established system [in the workplace] where
worker representatives meet with management," and whether the worker was
"a member of another type of association to assist with work related matters[,
including an] association . .. based on your occupation, race, gender, or some
other characteristic you identify with."74 Although the authors found relatively
high levels of both types of non-union representation systems in U.S.
workplaces, they found no evidence that the presence of either type of
organization impacted workers' propensity to vote for a union. That is, having
a workplace organization other than a union neither increased nor decreased
the likelihood that a worker would decide to support unionization.s7 1
170. Cf id. at 827-28 (discussing this effect in the context of company unions).
171. Id. at 762; see also id. at 761 (quoting AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland as stating that these
forms of workplace organization are "sham organizations designed to prevent real worker
empowerment").
172. John Godard & Carola Frege, Labor Unions, Alternative Forms of Representation, and the
Exercise ofAuthority in U.S. Workplaces, 66 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 142 (2013).
173. Id. at 146.
174. Id. at 151.
17s. Id. at 163. Other studies, based on far smaller samples, have found that non-union
representation systems can encourage unionization, see Daphne Gottlieb Taras & Jason
Copping, The Transition from Formal Nonunion Representation to Unionization: A
Contemporary Case, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 22 (1998) (describing Canadian labor
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It is not possible to predict with certainty how much managerial opposition
would be generated by a concern about political unions as a precursor to
traditional unionization. Given management's own willingness to experiment
with non-union forms of collective workplace organization, the lack of
managerial opposition to other types of employee organizations, and the
evidence that non-union forms of workplace representation do not increase
workers' propensity to support unions, however, it seems unlikely that
opposition generated by this concern would be severe or pervasive.76
Finally, and of equal importance, when management does oppose political
unions - as it will in certain circumstances - its opposition will likely have a
different social resonance than does opposition to traditional collective-
bargaining unions. Employees' collective economic activity is sufficiently
contested that management's decision to oppose union organizing does not
generate much social contestation.77 Perhaps the best piece of evidence for this
is that although managerial opposition to unionization is intense and
widespread, and quite often illegal, it produces essentially no public outcry. In
2010, for example, more than 16oo workers were offered reinstatement after
being illegally fired for union activity, and more than 17,000 workers received
conditions), or discourage it, see A. Tarik Timur et al., 'Shopping for Voice': Do Pre-Existing
Non-Union Representation Plans Matter When Employees Unionize?, 5o BRIT. J. INDUS. REL.
214 (2012) (same).
176. If this concern did lead to substantial managerial opposition, the concern could be addressed
in a number of ways. In some contemporary organizing campaigns, for example, unions
contractually agree that they will restrict their future organizing efforts in exchange for a
managerial pledge, for example, not to fight the union in the current campaign. See, e.g.,
Patterson v. Heartland Indus. Partners, 428 F. Supp. 2d 714, 716-17 (N.D. Ohio 20o6).
Political unions could likewise contractually agree not to engage in any efforts to organize
employees into traditional unions. The effect of this pledge would be somewhat limited:
employees themselves could not waive their right to engage in union organizing activity, see
29 U.S.C § 103 (2006), and other unions would not be barred by the pledge of the
contracting union. But the effect would not be nil. Going further, an unbundled labor law
could-by statute-preclude the organization of a collective-bargaining union at any firm
where a political union is organized. Such a provision would likely do more than dampen
managerial opposition and might well encourage management to support political unions as
a means of preventing traditional unionization. For just this reason, however, such a
provision would pose a problem for future collective bargaining efforts that unbundling
itself would not and is not intended to pose.
,n. See THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON? TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT'S





back pay for illegal employer conduct related to union activity.17' Despite the
remarkable scope of this anti-union activity, no major newspaper in the
country made more than passing reference to any of it. Most of the largest
papers did not report on it at all.179
While opposition to union organizing efforts fails to provoke public
concern, managerial opposition to employee political activity would likely be
viewed with greater skepticism. This is the case, in part, because political
1s. The figures are for fiscal year 2010. See Table 4. -Remedial Actions Taken in Unfair Labor
Practice Cases Closed, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD (2010), http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default
/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1696/table_4.pdf. As Gordon Lafer writes:
[E]ven the most serious type of illegal activity-actually firing, suspending, or
cutting the hours of employees in retaliation for supporting the creation of a
union-is extremely common. In 2004, an estimated 15,400 employees were
illegally fired, suspended, or otherwise financially penalized for supporting a
union in an election context. In that same year, the total number of potential
voters in NLRB elections was approximately 260,ooo; by this count, one
employee was illegally fired or suspended for every 17 eligible voters.
Gordon Lafer, Neither Free nor Fair: The Subversion of Democracy Under National
Labor Relations Board Elections, AM. RTS. AT WORK 6 (July 2007), http://
www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/NeitherFreeNorFair.pdf
(footnotes omitted). In 2007, the House Committee on Education and Labor similarly
reported as follows:
The numbers are staggering. Every 23 minutes, a worker is fired or otherwise
discriminated against because of his or her union activity.... [B]etween 1993 and
2003, an average of 22,633 workers per year received back pay from their
employers. In 2005, this number hit 31,358. A recent study . .. found that, in 2005,
workers engaged in pro-union activism "faced almost a 20 percent chance of
being fired during a union-election campaign."
H.R. REP. No. 110-23, at 8 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
179. This result was derived from a Lexis search of the ten newspapers with the largest
circulations in the nation: the Wall Street journal, USA Today, the New York Times, the Los
Angeles Times, the San Jose Mercury News, the Washington Post, the New York Daily News, the
New York Post, the Houston Chronicle, and the Philadelphia Inquirer.
It is also worth noting that the United States has a flourishing and sophisticated
industry of "anti-union consultants" whose work is dedicated solely to helping management
defeat unionization campaigns. See Logan, supra note 151. And while these consultants
deploy a range of strategies to stop unionization, illegal discharges are part of the toolkit of
" [t]he most ruthless." John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the 'Union Free'Movement in the
USA Since the 1970s, 33 INDUs. REL. J. 197, 207 (2002); see also John Logan, The Fine Art of
Union Busting, 13 NEw LAB. F. 76, 78 (2004) ("Recent studies have demonstrated that
antiunion consultants are now part of standard operating procedure, with three-quarters of
employers engaging their services when confronted by an organizing drive."). A flourishing
hundred-million dollar industry that encourages illegal opposition to unionization bespeaks
at least some degree of social acceptance of management's approach. See id.
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organizing is far more culturally mainstream in American public life than
union organizing.so A second factor is at work too. American social and legal
culture largely accepts managerial control over employees' worklife-over the
way that work is organized, carried out, and compensated. But there is greater
discomfort when management tries to use its economic power to control
noneconomic aspects of an employee's life, including the employee's political
activities.' During the latest presidential campaign, for example, a number of
corporations encouraged their employees to vote a particular way. Some firms,
in pressing employees to vote for the Republican nominee, suggested that an
Obama reelection would threaten the employees' jobs. Analogous employer
attempts to influence employee voting in union campaigns -including
suggestions that voting for the union will threaten jobs-are routine and
receive no attention. But the attempt by management to intervene in
employees' political voting was covered extensively, and with strong notes of
disapproval, in the media. Among other examples, the New York Times ran a
full-length, front-page article on the subject, titled Here's a Memo from the Boss:
Vote this Way.S The Houston Chronicle published a condemnatory editorial
arguing that "the boss has no business in your voting booth."'8  And two
iso. See GEOGHEGAN, supra note 177, at 8 (communicating how unions and union organizing are
not culturally mainstream). Indeed, political organizing is central to the American
constitutional scheme-it is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection of
associational rights-and it remains a highly visible and celebrated component of political
life. Over the past several years, to take some of the more prominent examples, the Tea
Party and MoveOn.org have both engaged in incredibly successful organizing efforts and
both been lauded-setting aside partisan differences-as examples of vigorous democratic
politics. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, ONE WAY FORWARD 13-14 (2012) (MoveOn.org); id. at
18-20 (Tea Party); Victoria Carty, Multi-Issue, Internet-Mediated Interest Organizations and
Their Implications for US Politics: A Case ofMoveOn.org,- o Soc. MOVEMENT STUD. 265, 266
(2011) (MoveOn.org); Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol & John Coggin, The Tea Party
and the Remaking ofRepublican Conservatism, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 25, 26-27 (2011) (Tea Party).
181. The instinct behind this differential may be a kind of sphere separation principle according
to which power derived in one sphere - the market, for example - is appropriately deployed
within that sphere but not outside of it. Cf WALZER, supra note 41; LINDA BOSNIAK, THE
CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN 44-45 (2oo6) (describing Walzer's theory of sphere separation).
i8z. Steven Greenhouse, Here's a Memo from the Boss: Vote this Way, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/1o/27/us/politics/bosses-offering-timely-advice
-how-to-vote.html; see Mike Elk, Koch Sends Pro-Romney Mailing to 45,ooo Employees
While Stifling Workplace Political Speech, IN THESE TiMEs, Oct. 14,
2012, http://inthesetimes.conVarticle/14o17/kochjindustries sends-45000employees-pro
romney-mailing; David A. Graham, Can Your Boss Threaten to Fire You if You Don't Vote for
Romney?, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 20, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2012/1/can-your-boss-threaten-to-fire-you-if-you-dont-vote-for-romney/2637o9-




prominent law professors excoriated the practice, calling it one of the "worst
pathologies of this second gilded age." 8 4
The commitment to this kind of spheres separation is also reflected in the
organizing principles of U.S. labor and employment law. Both legal regimes
give management extensive control over how work is organized, performed,
and compensated. Thus, the default rule in U.S. workplaces is individual
employment contracting,' which, in practice, means that management
generally sets the terms of the employment contract and employees choose
whether or not to accept employment under those terms.' Even if employees
unionize, thereby obligating management to bargain with the union over terms
and conditions of employment, management nonetheless retains the ultimate
right to refuse union proposals and implement its desired workplace policies.'81
While the law gives management substantial control over an employee's
worklife, it is more resistant to managerial attempts to control employees'
political activities. In fact, as Eugene Volokh has recently shown, legal
protection against employer interference with employee political activity has a
rich historical tradition in the United States.'" Thus, "the very first American
laws banning employment discrimination by private employers [were] voter
protection laws, which barred employers from discriminating against
employees based on how the employees voted." 9 Such voter protection
statutes have been on the books since the mid-18oos, but more recent
legislation protects a far broader range of employee political activity from
employer interference. To take just a few examples: Connecticut prohibits
2012, http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/The-boss-has-no-business-in-your
-voting-booth-3994653.php.
184. Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Election Bosses: How to Stop Employers from
Telling Workers Whom to Vote for, SLATE, Nov. 2, 2012, http://www.slate
.con/articles/newsandpolitics/jurisprudence/2012/11/how-congress-can-stop employers
_fromtelling-workers howto vote.html.
i8. See WEILER, supra note 124, at 228; Sachs, supra note 16, at 672; Cass R. Sunstein, Human
Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REv. 205, 208 (2001).
186. Management's ability to set particular terms, although generally not constrained by law, is
constrained by market forces. And, at the upper ends of the labor market, there is more
active bargaining over terms and conditions between firms and employees.
187. See Sachs, supra note 16, at 701-06. If management does impose its own terms, employees
have a right to strike. But other legal rules -primarily one giving management the right to
permanently replace striking workers - make the strike right a rather hollow one. See NLRB
v. Mackay Radio Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
iss. Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against
Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295 (2012).
189. Id. at 297.
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employment discrimination based on the "exercise . .. of rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment"; eight states prohibit employers from retaliating against
employees for "engaging in political activities"; two states along with Puerto
Rico and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination based on employees'
political party membership; and three states prohibit discrimination against
employees for "engaging in electoral activities." 90 Unlike in the case of union
organizing, moreover, there is no evidence that management violates these
statutes repeatedly or with impunity.
Outside the mainstream of labor and employment doctrine, further support
can be found in cases involving the tort of discharge against public policy. In
Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.,' 9' the employer instructed its employees to
engage in political-organizing activity -including canvassing and signature
gathering-in support of an insurance reform bill. The plaintiff-employee in
the case objected to the firm's political stand, refused to engage in the political
work, and was fired for doing so. The Third Circuit held that the discharge
was tortious because it was in violation of public policy. As the court put it,
where an employer "conditions employment upon political subordination," the
employer has exceeded the scope of its legitimate managerial authority.'92
The point here is not that management discipline of employees for
political-organizational activity would be illegal under existing law.'93 Rather,
the point is that these strands of labor and employment law reflect a view that
the exercise of managerial power is more acceptable with respect to the
economic terms and conditions of employment than with respect to employees'
political activity. To the extent that these legal principles capture a socio-
cultural view of the appropriate reach of managerial power,194 they support the
190. See id. at 310, 313-19, 325-26 (discussing and collecting citations to state laws).
191. 721 F.2d 894 (3 d Cir. 1983).
192. Id. at 9oo. This same judicial resistance to the export of managerial power beyond the
workplace can be seen in cases where employers discipline employees for their personal
relationships and personal activities. See, e.g., Guardsmark v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cit.
2007); Rulon-Miller v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct. App. 1984). But see
Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding the termination of an
at-will employee for her refusal to quit volunteer work with an AIDS organization).
193. Indeed, the legal protections necessary to facilitate the organization of political unions are
not available under current law, and thus this Essay proposes statutory protection for such
activity. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
194. This is not the place to argue whether-or to what extent-law reflects cultural
understandings. For some discussion of the question, see Goodwin Liu, Rethinking




proposition that managerial opposition to political unions would be met with a
less forgiving response than is managerial opposition to traditional unions.
B. Political Organizing Without Collective Bargaining?
The preceding Section provided reasons to predict that unbundling the
union's political and economic functions would increase the prospects for
political organizing through the union form. Although there are no extant
examples of the political unions this Essay envisions, this Section will offer
some preliminary evidence that under an unbundled regime workers would in
fact organize political unions. The evidence comes from recent organizing
efforts in sectors of the labor market to which, for various reasons, traditional
labor law does not apply. In these sectors, labor law does not require unions to
bundle political and economic functions. Indeed, in some of these sectors,
unions are legally precluded from collective bargaining but have nonetheless
engaged in successful political organizing campaigns.
In the homecare sector, traditional collective bargaining has often been
legally impossible because homecare workers are classified either as employees
of the single clients for whom they work or as independent contractors.'95
Despite the legal impossibility of collective bargaining, unions have
nonetheless led campaigns to organize homecare workers for political action. In
Illinois, for instance, at a time when homecare workers were barred from
collective bargaining, the homecare workers union led a campaign to enact a
"Homecare Workers Bill of Rights.""' Throughout the campaign, union
members hosted meetings with state representatives, testified at legislative
hearings, and lobbied on behalf of the bill.'9 The homecare union also took an
active role in more traditional electoral politics, running the field operation for
Mayor Harold Washington's reelection campaign in two key wards on
Chicago's south and west sides.9 Members participated in the union's door-
195. Sachs, supra note 36, at 383-84. Even if the NLRA had defined these independent
contractors as "employees" covered by the Act, collective bargaining would be
meaningless-that is, indistinct from individual bargaining-where each employer has only
one employee.
196. Keith Kelleher, A History of SEIU Local 88o, 1983-2ooS at 58-S9 (2005) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). The Service Employees International Union's homecare
organizing in California followed a similar model. It was exclusively a political effort in its
early stages, and it was similarly successful. See Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker
Organizing in California: An Analysis of a Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 6 (2002).
197. See Kelleher, supra note 196, at 61-62.
198. See id. at 73.
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to-door and onsite voter registration efforts, staffed phone banks that the
union ran on Washington's behalf, and took a central role in the union's get-
out-the-vote program on election day. 99
The Service Employees International Union's recent experience in the
nursing home industry also offers some evidence of the potential of politics-
only organizing. After years of unsuccessful attempts at traditional organizing
campaigns in California nursing homes, the union sought to reorient its efforts
away from collective bargaining and toward politics.2"0 This led the union to
craft an agreement with several nursing home chains that granted the union
access to employer property for the sole purpose of discussing political
mobilization with the workforce.2 o' The union's organizing efforts were thus
strictly limited to political campaigns -ones designed to increase the state's
financial support for nursing homes-but the efforts were nonetheless
successful in generating worker support and participation.0 2
It is worth noting that there is a strand of labor research suggesting
employees are more likely to participate in a union's political program if the
union is successful at delivering economic goods through collective
bargaining.203 This research indicates that a worker's "commitment" to her
union predicts much about if, and how, the worker will participate in union
activities. 20 4 And, as Herbert Asher and his colleagues report, commitment is
199. See E-mail from Keith Kelleher, President, SEIU Healthcare Ill. & Ind., to author (Aug. 15,
2012) (on file with author). In the four years between 1986 and 1990, several thousand
workers signaled their support for the union and about five hundred became dues-paying
members. See Kelleher, supra note 196, at 57. To be sure, there are idiosyncratic pieces of the
homecare story that would be absent for many political unions. For example, the homecare
industry depends heavily on state funding, and thus the connection between political work
and terms and conditions of employment in this industry is direct and clear. On the other
hand, the union's early organizing work had to succeed without the legally conferred
advantages that political unions would enjoy.
200. See, e.g., Erin Johansson, Labor-Management Partnerships as a Means to Employer
Neutrality 12 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For a general discussion of
SEIU's nursing home organizing work in California, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite
Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1153, 1180-87 (2011).
The author of this Essay worked in the SEIU legal department from 2002-2o6.
2o. See Johansson, supra note 200, at 15.
202. See id. at 16-17; Sachs, supra note 2oo, at 1184.
203. See HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA 49-50,
107, 123-24 (2001).
204. See, e.g., E. Kevin Kelloway & Julian Barling, Members' Participation in Local Union Activities:




highly correlated with the union's economic performance: a worker who
believes that her union has successfully improved wages and benefits is more
likely to have a high level of union commitment than is a worker who has not
benefitted from the union in these ways. 20 5 Asher et al. also find that the
relationship between union commitment and participation holds with respect
to the union's political activities.20s
Despite these findings, this literature does not imply that the loss of the
collective-bargaining function would preclude worker support for political
unions. To start, even if it is a union's economic performance that fuels worker
support for the union's political program, this does not entail a conclusion that
collective bargaining is a necessary predicate for political participation. To the
contrary, the union's political program can itself generate economic returns for
the membership.o7 Next, Asher et al.'s work suggests that economic
performance is important to union commitment because, traditionally, unions
are formed for the purpose of securing economic goods. Thus, they write:
"Unions came into being to deliver material benefits to their members: better
wages and benefits, and better working conditions. Not surprisingly, union
members judge their union based on how it delivers on these promises."20
Accordingly, a political union formed initially for non-economic purposes -for
example, to expand gun rights-would not need to deliver economic goods in
order to secure member commitment.
Moreover, while it is true that union commitment is related to political
participation, commitment is not the only explanatory variable. Asher et al.
themselves report that several other factors are significant correlates of political
participation: workers' agreement with the political positions taken by the
union, workers' views of what the authors call the "appropriateness of union
political activity," and whether union membership is voluntary or
Thacker et al., Union Commitment: An Examination ofAntecedent and Outcome Factors, 63 J.
OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 33 (1990).
205. See ASHERET AL., supra note 203, at 50-52.
206. See id. at 123-24.
207. Of course, in any union-organizing context, workers' initial commitment to the union must
precede the actual delivery of returns. Thus, in a traditional union, workers must decide to
participate in organizational and first-contract bargaining activity before they secure any
economic goods from the collective bargaining agreement. The same would be true with
political unions: an initial commitment would have to precede the union securing economic
returns through political action. As the above discussion shows, we have a good evidentiary
basis for believing that political unions could successfully generate this necessary level of
initial commitment. See supra text accompanying notes 195-202.
208. ASHER ET AL., supra note 203, at 5o.
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mandatory.209 In fact, political agreement is as strong a predictor of
participation as commitment is, and, when taken together, these three other
factors have about three times stronger a correlation to participation than does
commitment."' This is relevant to our analysis because workers who join a
political union will do so voluntarily."' They will accordingly be quite likely to
agree with the union's politics and to view the union's political activities
as appropriate.
IV. LAW AND ORGANIZING: DESIGNING AN UNBUNDLED REGIME
The last Part argued that unbundling the union would improve the
prospects for unionization as a political-organizational vehicle. But an
important design question remains: what statutory work is required to
unbundle the union and make political unions viable? This Part describes these
necessary statutory reforms.
But before doing that, it is important to reiterate that even an unbundled
labor law would need to offer several types of affirmative protection to
employees engaged in the project of organizing political unions. These
protections would not be extensive, but would be critical. In Section II.B, this
Essay described the ways in which labor law enables traditional unions to take
advantage of the workplace as a locus of organizational activity. The law
functions this way by prohibiting employers from banning employee speech
about organizational activity in non-work areas of the workplace and during
non-work time. The law also allows unions to use the employer's payroll
system as a dues-deduction mechanism, gives unions access to the employer's
informational resources about employees for organizational purposes, and
offers anti-retaliation protection to workers engaged in organizational activity.
To facilitate the successful organization of political unions, an unbundled labor
law should offer the same kinds of guarantees. Thus, employers should be
prohibited from banning employee speech about political unions in non-
working areas of the workplace and during non-work time. Allowing political
unions to use payroll deduction as a mechanism for collecting dues from those
employees who consent to such payments would enable political unions to
209. See id. at 123-24.
2io. See id. at 124 tbl.6.5.





overcome the collective action costs involved in dues collection."' Political
unions should be provided access to information about the composition of the
workforce, at least subsequent to a showing of support by some significant
portion of the workforce. And, finally, employers should be prohibited from
retaliating against employees based on the employees' support for or
participation in political unions. 13
To be sure, every provision in the National Labor Relations Act that deals
with union organizing rights-and all of the administrative and judicial
interpretations of those provisions -would impact political unions' potential.
Amending the statute to permit non-employee organizers to access company
property, or to make punitive damages available against employers who
discipline employees for union activity, or to add a private right of action,
would all contribute to the success of organizational activity. But these avenues
are beside the point. What matters here is that unbundling the union and
212. A statutory requirement that employers allow dues deduction for political unions could be
subject to a compelled subsidization of speech challenge, but several points bear mention in
this respect. First, the current statute effects a similar requirement by making the refusal to
accept payroll deduction evidence of a refusal to bargain in good faith, see supra text
accompanying notes 113-114, even though dues deducted from payroll can be used for
political purposes. Second, under current law, requiring employers to allow payroll
deduction is unlikely to amount to compelled speech because the employer is not actually
required "to express a message he disagrees with" and because it is unlikely that the speech
of a union-funded by employee dues that are voluntarily deducted from payroll -would be
attributed to the employer. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005).
See generally Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195 (distinguishing First Amendment claims of compulsion
from compelled subsidization cases). A claim that such a statutory requirement amounts to
compelled subsidization of speech is more colorable but would constitute a significant
expansion of current doctrine, given the minimal cost to the employer of allowing such a
payroll deduction. In the event that a court were willing to expand the doctrine in this way,
however, the problem likely could be alleviated by requiring the union to reimburse the
employer for the administrative costs involved in allowing the deduction, which, again,
would be minimal. Finally, given the availability of credit card and bank draft payment
systems, the payroll deduction, while useful, may not be as critical as other legal
interventions to the viability of political unions.
213. The match between those the NLRA defines as "employees," see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (20o6),
and those in the bottom nine income deciles is close but not perfect. See supra note 83. Thus,
although using the current NLRA definition of employees in an unbundled regime would
permit some workers in the top income decile to organize political unions, the current
definition is consistent with the overall goal of enhancing the organizational capacity of
those in the bottom nine income deciles. An unbundled regime might narrow the definition
of employee to account for income, but such an approach would produce significant
administrability costs, and, given the close fit between the current definition and the target
income groups, such costs are likely not worth the benefits they would produce.
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preserving for political unions labor law's basic and extant protections would
itself improve the prospects for unionization as a political-organizational
vehicle.
The actual statutory work involved in unbundling would not be extensive
or difficult. The National Labor Relations Act gives employees the right to
"self-organization," which includes the right to "form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."11 4 Amendments aimed
at unbundling unions' twin functions would establish that the right to "form,
join, or assist labor organizations" includes the right to "form, join, or assist
organizations not for the purpose of collective bargaining." Concomitantly,
amendments would clarify that the "concerted activities" protected by the law
include concerted activities related to the range of political activities that a
political union could undertake, whether or not such activities would qualify as
"mutual aid or protection" under current law.21s
Next, under current law, once a group of employees forms a labor
organization, that organization has a statutory obligation to "bargain
collectively with [the] employer,""' and such collective bargaining must
include bargaining over the economic terms of the employment relationship. 17
An amended statute would make clear that, as to the new non-collective
bargaining organization, there would exist no "mutual obligation" on the part
of either an employer or the union to bargain over terms and conditions of
employment. The unfair labor practices section of the law would reflect this
change by clarifying that an employer does not violate the law by refusing to
bargain with such a union, and that such a union does commit an unfair labor
practice by attempting to engage the employer in bargaining over terms and
214. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Again, this Essay focuses on the NLRA and private-sector labor law, but the
moves necessary to amend state labor laws for public-sector workers would be largely
analogous. Details, of course, would need to be worked out depending on the precise
structure of each individual state statute, but those details are beyond the scope here.
215. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (discussing the scope of mutual aid and
protection with respect to political activities). To clarify, the statute would need to prohibit
employer retaliation for the full range of activity that a political union would undertake,
even though, of course, it would not need to permit all this activity to occur in the
workplace. What would need protection in the workplace is, as described above,
organizational activity related to the formation of political unions, not the carrying out of
the union's political work once the union is formed.
216. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3).




conditions of employment.21' Finally, recall that the current regime requires the
employer to negotiate -as part of its overall collective-bargaining obligation -
dues checkoff provisions." 9 Because political unions will not engage in
collective bargaining, an unbundled labor law would need to establish that a
political union designated by employees is entitled to collect dues directly from
the employer through a payroll deduction system.20
Beyond these straightforward statutory moves, unbundling would require
addressing one important conceptual issue. Under current law, an employer is
obligated to recognize a union if and when a majority of employees in a
relevant "bargaining unit" -essentially, a subgroup of the workforce that
shares a set of common interests -votes for union representation."' Moreover,
under current rules, if a majority of workers votes to unionize, the union
becomes the bargaining representative of all the workers in the unit, even those
who opposed unionization."' This is the so-called rule of exclusive
representation, and it is designed to ensure the efficacy of collective bargaining:
by establishing that the union speaks for all the workers in the unit, exclusive
representation aims to prevent employers from playing different factions of
workers off each other to the detriment of the whole.2 3 At least in non-right-
to-work states, 4 the rule also permits the union to collect mandatory dues
from all the workers in the unit, even those workers who voted against
unionization, in order to prevent any workers from free riding off the financial
contributions of others."2
With regard to political unions, however, there is no call for exclusive
representation: because the union will not bargain over a contract with the
employer, the threat of the employer exploiting factions to undermine the
2is. These changes would be made to § 158(a)(5) and § 158(b)( 3) respectively.
2ig. See supra text accompanying note 113.
2o. Subject to the discussion infra accompanying notes 226-227.
2zi. See 29 U.S.C. § 159.
222. See id.
223. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, ADVICE MEMORANDUM: DICK'S SPORTING
GOODS, CASE 6-CA-34 821, at io (June 22, 2006), http://mynlrb.nlrb.govAink
/document.aspx/o903ld458ooda97d, 2006 WL 2992401 ("[M]inority representation could
provide employers a ready method of precluding true collective bargaining by playing the
different minority representatives off against each other.").
224. See 29 U.S.C. § 164 (b).
225. See id. § 158(a)(3); Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); see also Dau-
Schmidt, supra note 126 (discussing Beck and union security agreements); Sachs, supra note
u, at 811-19 (same). In right-to-work states, mandatory dues requirements of this sort are
prohibited. See Sachs, supra note 115, at 811-19.
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union's bargaining strength is inapposite. Moreover, given the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in this area, mandatory dues collection would likely not
be permissible in political unions, even in the private sector. As the Court has
held, the NLRA permits unions to collect mandatory dues from all employees
in a bargaining unit, but only for the purposes of collective bargaining and
contract administration." With respect to the union's political program, all
dues payments must be fully voluntary, and employees accordingly must be
provided a right to opt out of funding any of the union's political expenditures.
And although the Court's holding on this score with respect to private sector
unions is formally based on its interpretation of the statute, it is clear that the
Court's reasoning is either driven by the canon of constitutional avoidance
or, at the least, informed by "constitutional values." 27 With respect to
public employees and public-sector unions, the rule is explicitly a
constitutional one.128
Accordingly, a legal regime that permitted unions to collect dues for
political purposes from employees who objected to paying those dues would be
flatly unconstitutional in the public sector and it would face significant
constitutional difficulties in the private sector.229 Even if constitutionally
permissible, however, requiring employees to pay dues to support a political
union would be undesirable as a policy matter. Indeed, for the same reasons
that employer opposition to employee political activity would be viewed
skeptically, a rule requiring employees to fund union political activity with
which they disagreed would be viewed with similar skepticism. This hostility
would produce not only political opposition to the statutory changes necessary
for unbundling, but would also impede the organizational potential of political
unions once authorized by statute. Thus, rather than serving as exclusive
226. See Sachs, supra note 115, at 813-19.
227. Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector
Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 83 (1989); see James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective
Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 939, 1028 & n.298
(1996).
228. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
229. For the public-sector rule, see, for example, Knox v. SEIU, Local iooo, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
To invalidate such a rule for private sector unions on First Amendment grounds, the Court
would have to find state action in the private-sector union context. The Supreme Court has
not addressed this question directly, and scholars are divided on whether there is sufficient
government involvement in the mandatory dues context to trigger constitutional review. See
Sachs, supra note 115, at 844-46, 849-51 (reviewing the doctrine and competing scholarly
arguments). Compare Dau-Schmidt, supra note 126, at 125-32 (rejecting the presence of state
action), with David H. Topol, Note, Union Shops, State Action, and the National Labor




bargaining agents, political unions should be designed to resemble the kind of
"minority" or members-only unions that Charles Morris describes: employees
could form a political union even if the union is supported only by a minority
of the workforce, and the union, in turn, would represent and collect dues from
only those workers who affirmatively desire to be members.23o
V. BEYOND THE WORKPLACE
Because unbundling the political and economic functions of unions will
better enable political organizing by those in the lower and middle classes,
unbundling is justified by a commitment to representational equality. But the
goal of representational equality invites us to think beyond unions to a more
comprehensive set of reforms designed to facilitate organizing by
underrepresented groups. A full discussion of such a program is beyond the
scope of this Essay, but a few preliminary observations are in order.
As this Essay has argued, labor law has facilitated unions' organizational
success by providing a geographic locus for organizational activity, offering a
mechanism for funding organizational activity, making available the
information necessary for organizing, and protecting employees against
retaliation. These same basic legal interventions could be deployed to facilitate
organizing in other contexts. In particular, where the government provides
services to constituencies in the relevant income groups, it could supplement
the services it provides with legal rules designed to facilitate political
organizing around the service. Importantly, such interventions would be
substantively neutral as a matter of design: they would enable organizing but
would take no position on - and indeed exert no influence over - the types of
policies the groups would pursue once organized.
This suggestion may sound quite foreign, but it has historical roots.
During the mid-196os, as part of President Johnson's war on poverty,
Congress established Community Action Programs (CAPs) as part of the new
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The CAPs were charged with
involving low-income community members in the design and implementation
of the anti-poverty programs that were to serve them. In fact, the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964 dictated that CAPs were to be "developed, conducted,
203
230. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 8-9 (2005).
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and administered with the maximum feasible participation of the residents of
the area and members of the groups served."23'
Although the statutory charge of maximum feasible participation was a
highly contested one, to those running the OEO and the CAPs, "participation"
implied more than simple involvement in the bureaucratic and administrative
operation of welfare programs. Under the OEO, community participation came
to imply governmental support- including financial support-for political
organizing by the poor. Thus, in the leading study of the CAPs, J. David
Greenstone and Paul Peterson explain that community action "became an
attack on political poverty, oriented toward increasing the political participation
of previously excluded citizens, particularly black Americans." 3 ' As Greenstone
and Peterson describe:
In order to achieve the maximum in participation . . . CAPs were
expected to redistribute political power through the mobilization of
deprived groups. Techniques designed to achieve this goal included
recruitment of issue-oriented community organizers, financial
assistance to indigenous community organizations, formation of
community corporations, voter registration drives, [and] sponsorship
of protest demonstrations . . . .
Indeed, the OEO itself suggested that local CAPs "assist the poor in
developing autonomous and self-managed organizations which are competent
to exert political influence on behalf of their own self-interest." 34
231. Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202(a) (3), 78 Stat. 5o8, 516.
232. Paul E. Peterson & J. David Greenstone, Racial Change and Citizen Participation: The
Mobilization of Low-Income Communities Through Community Action, in A DECADE OF
FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, AND LESSONS 241, 241 (Robert
E. Haveman ed., 1977) (emphasis added); see also J. DAVID GREENSTONE & PAUL E.
PETERSON, RACE AND AUTHORITY IN URBAN POLITICS: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND THE
WAR ON POVERTY 7 (1973) ("[T] he fundamental political objective was generally understood
to be the organization and consequent institutionalization of black (and other minority
group) interests . . . .").
233. Peterson & Greenstone, supra note 232, at 264.
234. GREENSTONE & PETERSON, supra note 232, at 5 (quoting OFFICE OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY,
COMMUNITY ACTION WORKBOOK, at III.A.5 (1965)). Thus Richard Blumenthal concludes
that the CAPs were to "finance community organizing as a kind of political antitrust
measure." Richard Blumenthal, The Bureaucracy: Antipoverty and the Community Action
Program, in AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY: FIVE CONTEMPORARY
STUDIES 129, 139-40 (Allan P. Sindler ed., 1969). And while political opposition gave the
program a short lifespan, see id. at 132, the program nonetheless gave birth to significant




In the contemporary setting, public assistance programs provide a
promising context for expanding on the labor law model developed in this
Essay.2 35 Following this model, revised public assistance statutes could, first,
make welfare centers available for political-organizational activity.236 Welfare
centers, like workplaces, provide natural gathering places for recipients and
would offer a centralized location for organizing. Next, just as labor law allows
unions to collect dues through authorized payroll deductions, this regime could
enable benefits recipients to authorize dues payments directly from their
benefits.2 " As labor law gives unions the names and addresses of workers in the
bargaining unit, revised benefits laws could give welfare organizers the names
the growth and institutionalization of black political power in certain cities, including
Newark, see Peterson & Greenstone, supra note 232, at 272, and with generating political
protest movements in a number of others, see Blumenthal, supra, at 130-33.
235. For an excellent review of welfare organizing efforts in the United States, see NICK KoTZ &
MARY LYNN KoTz, APASSION FOREQUALITY: GEORGE A. WILEY AND THE MOVEMENT (1977).
236. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993 provides some limited precedent for
this type of program. Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 1973gg
(2006)). The NVRA mandates that all State offices providing public assistance serve as
"voter registration agencies" and provide registration assistance to eligible voters. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973gg-5(a)(1)-(4). The motivation behind this provision of the statute was to increase
political participation by the poor by making the centralized location of the welfare center
available for political activity. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-66, at 19 (1993) (explaining that
requiring public assistance offices to serve as registration sites will "assure[] that almost all
of our citizens will come into contact with an office at which they may apply to register to
vote"); see also 139 Cong. Rec. 4845 (1993) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("[T]his piece of
legislation is about expanding political participation in the United States."). See generally
Pedro De Oliveira, Same Day Voter Registration: Post-Crawford Reform to Address the Growing
Burdens on Lower-Income Voters, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 345, 353 (2009).
237. The state could also fund organizers directly, but organizing theory suggests that requiring
members to pay dues is important for the development of organizational commitment. As
such, direct government funding of organizational work may not be the most efficacious
approach. See MARSHALL GANz, WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS: LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION,
AND STRATEGY IN THE CALIFORNIA FARM WORKER MOVEMENT 100 (2009) (quoting Cesar
Chavez, who explained, "A union must have members who pay dues regularly.... Because
they pay so much, they feel they are the important part of the organization; that they have a
right to be served. They don't hesitate to write, to call, to ask for things-and to reaffirm
their position in the association. . . . [T]he idea that the members are, alone, paying the
salary of a man who is responsible to them is very important."); Howard S. Becker, Notes on
the Concept of Commitment, 66 AM. J. Soc. 32, 35-38 (1960) (proposing that "side bets"
increase commitment to an organization); Thomas W. Gruen et al., Relationship Marketing
Activities, Commitment, and Membership Behaviors in Professional Associations, 64 J.
MARKETING 34, 37 (2000) ("The membership's prepayment of dues represents an initial
economic investment in the relationship. As such, it creates a potency that motivates the
members to recover their investment. . . .").
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and addresses of benefits recipients.* And, finally, the law would need to
ensure that recipients who became active in political organizing efforts faced no
negative repercussions for doing so.
Public education-one of the largest government-run programs in the
United StateS239 -is another context in which law might generate political
organizing.24o By making public schools available for organizational purposes,
providing information about parents to organizers, and allowing organizers to
use the public schools' administrative capacity to facilitate dues collection from
parents, the state could help build a political organization of public school
parents. Public hospitals, libraries, and even public recreation centers could
similarly be used to support political organizing among the poor and
middle class.
CONCLUSION
The risk that economic inequalities will produce political ones, long a
concern of democratic theorists and political scientists, has led to several
generations of campaign finance regulation designed to get money out of
politics. But these efforts have not succeeded. Rather than struggling to find
new ways to restrict political spending by the wealthy, this Essay has argued
that representational equality can be advanced by legal mechanisms designed
to facilitate the organizational capacity of those for whom the current system
has become unresponsive.
Historically in the United States, labor law has been the most important
legal mechanism of this type, and the labor union a primary vehicle for the
political organization of the poor and middle class. Accordingly, as this Essay
238. To address privacy concerns that might be heightened in the benefits context, such a regime
could require recipient consent-perhaps in opt-out form to encourage participation-
before disclosure.
239. As of the 2008-2009 academic year, state and local governments spent about $862 billion on
education and libraries. Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, INST.
EDUC. SCI. tbl.30 (Oct. 31, 2on), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/du/tables
/dtllo30.asp. Federal spending in fiscal year 2010 amounted to just under $300 billion. Id.
tbl-384, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/di1/tables/dt11_384.asp.
240. Local political organizing among low-income public school parents has seen some success.
See John Rogers, Forces of Accountability? The Power of Poor Parents in NCLB, 76 HARV.
EDUC. REv. 611, 625-32 (2006); see also JEANNIE OAKES & JOHN ROGERS WITH MARTIN
LIPTON, LEARNING POWER: ORGANIZING FOR EDUCATION AND JUSTICE 111-30 (20o6)




has shown, labor law offers important lessons about how to construct a
program of legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing among
currently underrepresented groups. The unbundled union, in which political
organization is liberated from collective bargaining, constitutes one promising
component of such a broader attempt to improve representational equality.
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